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“The land shall be shared among those who work it!” – The Freedom Charter1 
 
“Property may be expropriated only … for a public purpose or in the public interest … subject to 
compensation” – Section 25 of the Constitution of South Africa2 
 
“Section 25 of the Constitution must be amended to make explicit that which is implicit in the 
Constitution with regards to expropriation of land without compensation as a legitimate option 
for land reform”- Economic Freedom Fighters Deputy Leader Floyd Shivambu3 
 
In 1913, the Natives Land Act delegated black South Africans, who represented 67 
percent of the population, to seven percent of the country’s arable land. In 2017, black South 
Africans accounted for 81 percent of the population and still owned only four percent of the 
land.4 Land rights and distribution remain one of the most contentious political issues in South 
Africa not only because of continued disparity but also because of the implications that the land 
question has had as an indication of the ANC’s ability to deliver restitutive justice. The 
Constitutional Property Clause (known as Section 25), crafted by compromise between the ANC 
and the apartheid government during the transition to democracy in the early 1990s, protected 
both apartheid-era property rights and at the same time allowed the newly elected ANC 
government to expropriate land in order to redress past discriminatory injustice. In 2019, the 
ANC sought to stabilize their political hegemony and quell criticisms of ineffective land reform 
                                                 
1 Congress of the People, “The Freedom Charter,” Klipton, South Africa, June 1955, 
https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/freedom-charter. 
2 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Section 25.  
3 Jan Gerber, “Land Expropriation: EFF Brings ANC’s Recommendation to Constitutional 
Review Committee,” News 24, November 15, 2018, 
https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/land-expropriation-eff-brings-ancs-
recommendation-to-constitutional-review-committee-20181115.  
4 Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, Land Audit Report, November 2017, 
https://www.sapeople.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/land_audit_report_05jan2018_final.pdf. 
Statistics South Africa, Mid-Year Population Estimates, July 31, 2017, 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0302/P03022017.pdf.  
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through promises to amend Section 25 and expand the government’s right to expropriate. In spite 
of this, the historical analysis developed in this paper demonstrates that the problem with land 
reform in South Africa is not the content of Section 25. The history of politics, policy and land 
reform laws from the 1980s to 2019, demonstrates that the land question remains not because of 
an ineffective clause but because of the ANC’s political inability to implement policy that 
delivers on the symbolic promise of restitutive justice to its landless and land poor constituents.  
The Natives Land Act of 1913 institutionalized a process of European conquest and 
dispossession of land that had occurred throughout the 19th century. It restricted land ownership 
in South Africa based on race. Under legal apartheid, beginning with the election of the National 
Party in 1948, the government used the racially divided land system to restrict black people’s 
access to urban centers, deflect political responsibility to ethnic traditional leaders, and relocate 
the black population to ethnic homelands. Only during negotiations to reform and ultimately end 
apartheid in the 1980s did the apartheid government begin to change this system of racialized 
dispossession. During early land reform efforts in the post-apartheid era, the Acts’ passage in 
1913 served as the starting date from which applicants could make land restitution claims to the 
state.5 Due to the statutory and political significance of this date, the history of land policy in this 
paper begins in 1913, even so, it is necessary to acknowledge that land restrictions due to race 
began earlier.  
In 1910, the British colonies and former Boer republics joined to form the Union of South 
Africa. At the time of the Union, land reserves existed to varying degrees. These reserves acted 
as the basis for the later ethnic homelands. The desires of the white farmers and miners, the 
                                                 
5 Ruth Hall, “Land Restitution in South Africa: Rights, Development, and the Restrained State,” 
Canadian Journal of African Studies 38 no. 3 (2004): 655. 
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history of military and amicable interaction with chiefs and the population distribution between 
rural and town land influenced the formation of reserves within the states. For the government, 
the object of the 1913 Act was to standardize and make rigid the disparate policies across the 
four states. The first government of the Union relied on the support of white agricultural and 
mining interests, referred to by historian Stanley Trapido as the union of “maize and gold.”6 
These groups favored the expansion of a racialized land reserves system not only because it gave 
agricultural land to white farmers but also because it provided white mining interests with a 
stable and cheap labor pool of men.7 For the mining industries, the reserve system tied African 
workers to a permanent home and exempted white mine owners from paying wages to support 
the workers’ families as the families were subsistence farmers on the reserve.  
In response to the 1913 Act, middle-class, educated Africans formed the South African 
Native National Congress (SANNC), a precursor to the African National Congress (ANC). 
Evidently, the roots of the ANC as a liberation movement lay in early recognition among black 
South Africans that losing rights to land preceded losing a range of political and human rights. 
Through the first half of the twentieth century, the ANC’s constituency swelled as it re-oriented 
itself as an anti-apartheid movement instead of an elite organization. Yet as the transition to 
democracy loomed in the 1990s, the ANC leadership lost its early sense of the centrality of land 
and it failed to develop policy that corresponded with the ideals of its broad support base. The 
                                                 
6 Stanley Trapido, “Landlord and Tenant in a Colonial Economy: The Transvaal 1880-1910,” 
Journal of Southern African Studies 5 no. 1 (October 1978): 52-53; Robert Morrell, “The 
Disintegration of the Gold and Maize Alliance in South Africa in the 1920s,” The International 
Journal of African Historical Studies 21 no. 4 (1988): 619. 
7 Laurine Platzky and Cherryl Walker, The Surplus People: Forced Removals in South Africa 
(Braamfontein: Ravan Press, 2017): 84; Anthony Christopher, “A South African Domesday 
Book: the First Union Census of 1911,” South African Geographical Journal 92 no. 1 (2010): 
83. 
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ANC’s failure to meet their constituents’ expectations occurred through three stages: pre-
transition policy development, mid-transition constitution writing, and post-transition policy 
implementation. Accordingly, the following three chapters depict the interplay of politics, policy, 
and law that led to unmet expectations in each of these stages.  
 
Literature on Land Reform 
The vast majority of scholarly literature on land reform in South Africa seeks to diagnose 
a failure of delivery. The objective of these studies is to locate where, in the history of 
dispossession, the roots of current inequity lie and to prescribe a form of redress from this 
identification. Three common themes run through the literature: ethnographic critiques of local 
land reform infrastructure; institutional critiques of the judiciary’s role in land reform; and 
political critiques of the ANC’s priorities and leadership.  
The purpose of this thesis is to explain the ANC’s ineffective land reform through a 
history of law and politics. I divide this history into three key eras and trace how in each, 
political actions responded to developments in law and developments in law in turn reflected 
political priorities. Through this approach I touch on structural, judicial, and political elements. 
Ultimately, I build upon the literature that highlights failure at each of these levels to argue that 
the proposed amendment of Section 25 is ineffective because historically, political tension within 
the ANC and between the ANC and NP produced land laws and policies that perpetuated 
continued political inaction.  
In her multiple works on the land reform issue in South Africa, sociologist Cherryl 
Walker combines ethnography with analysis to argue that poor organization and lack of 
resources limited the effect of land restitution agencies. Walker worked as a Regional Land 
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Claims Commissioner on the Commission on Restitution of Land Rights (CRLR) between 1995 
and 2000. The CRLR was part of the tripartite system established by the ANC to manage land 
restitution claims. This system consisted of the CRLR, the Department of Land Affairs (DLA), 
and the Land Claims Court (LCC). The CRLR and the DLA were interdependent agencies of the 
state responsible for drawing up land claims settlements. The LCC was the court charged, 
initially, with authorizing each of these claims even if there was no dispute. The guaranteed 
judicial review and system of checks and balances was meant to allay National Party fears that 
the new government would freely expropriate land from white owners. However, Walker argues, 
it was unclear which specific responsibilities were assigned to each agency, and this interfered 
with the proper resolution of claims for restitution of land allocation.8 Walker also argues that the 
limited scope, in terms of time and resources, of the programs precluded any option but failure.  
Institutional critiques of the judiciary’s role in land reform recognize that both the nature 
of the South African judiciary and the extent of the task of land reform also assured a failure of 
delivery. These criticisms often focus on the victims of forced removals and argue the Land 
Claims Court (LCC) was ill-equipped to deliver restorative justice. The LCC furthered an 
adversarial, market-based relationship between the dispossessed and the land owner or, 
frequently, between the dispossessed and the state. This context did not offer the same potential 
for healing or restitutive justice as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Historian 
Elmien Du Plessis argues land should have been included in the TRC to give the dispossessed a 
voice. 9 The LCC’s operation in solely the realm of physical value and compensation failed to 
                                                 
8 Cherryl Walker, “Finite Land: Challenges Institutionalising Land Restitution in South Africa, 
1995-2000,” Journal of Southern African Studies 38, no. 4 (December 2012): 809–26. 
9 Elmien Du Plessis, “Property in Transitional Times: The Glaring Absence of Property at the 
TRC,” in The Limits of Transition: The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 20 
Years On, ed. Mia Swart and Karin van Marle (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2007): 94-121. 
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rectify lasting senses of moral violation. Historian Bernadette Atuahene describes the 
dispossessions under apartheid as “dignity takings.”10 The state confiscated land and expelled 
people because they conceived of them as less than human. Restitution of the physical land does 
not restore this denied humanity.  
In one of her numerous pieces on South African land reform, historian Ruth Hall argues 
that the judiciary’s extensive role in land reform allowed the executive to avoid the necessary 
task of restructuring the agrarian system in order to overhaul distribution.11 Theunis Roux 
explains that the formal nature of judicial culture in South Africa often meant LCC judges did 
not view the court as an aid to an activist project of restoring justice. With the new constitution, 
the court system transitioned from prioritizing the policy preferences of legislators over the 
constitution to enforcing the constitution over legislators. Judicial culture was thereby 
characterized by formalism: an ingrained tendency among judges to refer primarily and 
extensively to doctrine in their decision making as opposed to actively pursuing certain 
principles like restitutive justice.12 When unclear, the court referred to common law or statute 
instead of prioritizing the interests of the poorer black applicants.13 While this did not prove to be 
true at the level of the Constitutional Court, which had a clear mandate to operate with a purview 
of rectifying the wrongs of apartheid, lasting judicial formalism became a restraining influence 
                                                 
10 Bernadette Atuahene, We Want What’s Ours (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2014): 3. 
11 Ruth Hall, “Land Restitution in South Africa: Rights, Development, and the Restrained State,” 
Canadian Journal of African Studies 38, no 3 (2004): 654-671. 
12 Theunis Roux, “Pro-Poor Court, Anti-Poor Outcomes: Explaining the Performance of the 
South African Land Claims Court,” South African Journal on Human Rights 20 no. 4 (2004): 
511-43. 
13 Roux, “Pro-Poor Court”; Ben Cousins “Land Reform in South Africa is Sinking: Can it be 
saved?” Nelson Mandela Foundation. 
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within the lower courts, such as the LCC, limiting their efficacy as a tool of social 
transformation.  
Lastly, and evident not only in scholarship but in political discourse in South Africa at 
least since the inauguration of President Jacob Zuma in 2009, are political critiques of the 
African National Congress (ANC). Political critiques of the ANC rest on the nature and extent of 
concessions made to the NP, the ANC’s focus on urban issues at the neglect of the rural poor, 
and acceptance of neo-liberal models for market redistribution. Marinda Weideman argues the 
ANC adopted a neo-liberal land reform policy which maintained the existing power of elites and 
failed to reallocate land to poor blacks. This adoption was due to pressure from the NP, 
commercial agriculture lobbies, and institutions like the IMF and World Bank. The ANC was 
susceptible to external pressure in part because of its failure to establish a specific position on 
land reform beyond a vague call for increased state control. 14 Michael Aliber argues that 
critiques of the practical inefficacy and immorality of the ANC’s Willing Buyer, Willing Seller 
land policy ought to be reframed as critiques of the ANC as a political party.15 During the 
transition, Richard Spitz and Matthew Chaskalson explain, the ANC, anticipating democratic 
elections, sought to build legitimacy. Ironically, during this transition, the ANC moved further 
away from reflecting the ambitions of its followers.16 Chaskalson echoes this critique in a 
separate piece where he specifically decries the lack of organization and transparency in the 
                                                 
14 Marinda Weideman, “Who Shaped South Africa’s Land Reform Policy?” Politikon 31 no. 2 
(November 2004): 235. 
15 Michael Aliber, “Unravelling the ‘Willing Buyer, Willing Seller’ Question,” in Land Divided, 
Land Restored: Land Reform in South Africa for the 21st Century, ed. Ben Cousins and Cherryl 
Walker (Auckland Park: Jacana, 2015): 145-160. 
16 Richard Spitz and Matthew Chaskalson, The Politics of Transition: A Hidden History of South 
Africa’s Negotiated Settlement (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press Publications, 
2000). 
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ANC during the negotiations.17 The ANC’s lack of organization had lasting ramifications for its 
constituents. The ANC leadership’s attention centered on the debates with the NP and the 
coming democratic elections instead of on ensuring protections for its marginalized 
constituents.18 In a piece from 2015, Hall criticizes the ANC’s prioritization of farming as a 
continuation of the NP’s creation of ethnic homelands. The focus on relatively elite black 
farmers perpetuated a labor pool of landless black people.19 Historically, Hall argues, the ANC’s 
ineffective land reform has been due to its tendency to divide the land question into separate 
issues of justice and development. Throughout the negotiations and into its tenure as the ruling 
party, the ANC’s policies prioritized development while forsaking delivering restitutive justice 
instead of seeking strategies that addressed the multiple layers of land rights.  
 
Methodology, Sources, and Description 
This paper would not have been possible without the extensive online databases of South 
African History Online, O’Malley Archives, South African Legal Information Institute, the 
Constitutional Court, and the Justice Department.20 These websites contained nearly all of the 
                                                 
17 Matthew Chaskalson, “Stumbling Towards Section 28: Negotiations Over the Protection of 
Property Rights in the Interim Constitution,” South African Journal on Human Rights 11, no. 2 
(1995): 222-240. 
18 Hassen Ebrahim and Laurel Miller, “Creating the Birth Certificate of a New South Africa: 
Constitution Making after Apartheid,” in Framing the State in Times of Transition: Case Studies 
in Constitution Making ed. Laurel Miller (Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace 
Press, 2010):111-157.  
19 Ruth Hall, “Who, What, Where, How, Why? The Many Disagreements About Land 
Redistribution in South Africa,” in Land Divided, Land Restored: Land Reform in South Africa 







legal opinions, statutes, and draft bills used in this project. The multiple drafts of early ANC land 
policy documents and property clauses during the negotiations process proved essential to 
tracing the timelines of developing policy. To contextualize the evolution from one draft to the 
next, I relied on published writings and interviews with key negotiators.21 These memoirs and 
interviews illuminate the influence of personal relationships among negotiators as well as 
pressures from external bodies, particularly the World Bank. Each chapter combines formal 
documents with personal accounts to explain how political strategy and published policy and law 
influenced each other.  
The first chapter traces the development of ANC land policy before formal negotiations 
with a focus on the political response of the liberation movement to the implementation and later 
repeal of apartheid land laws. Opposition to the passage of early racial land laws spurred the 
development of the movement and allowed the ANC to gain broad support for their sweeping 
rejections of racist land dispossession. From the 1920s to the 1950s, ANC land policy developed 
first under the influence of African nationalism and then communism. The NP’s repeal of 
apartheid land laws in the 1980s and the impending negotiations surrounding the transition led 
the ANC leadership to focus their politics on achieving democracy in a unitary South Africa 
along with their electoral victory. Due to this focus as well as disparate political ideologies 
within the ANC leadership, and unquestionable political support from the majority of South 
Africans, the ANC was not politically motivated to develop a cohesive land policy that 
corresponded with earlier revolutionary promises to its constituents. The ANC entered formal 
constitutional negotiations with an ambiguous and ambivalent land policy.  
                                                 
21 See Meyer 2001; Ramaphosa 2001; Du Plessis 1994; Coles 1993; Hall 2010. 
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The second chapter follows the formal negotiation process to the passage of the 
Restitution of Land Rights Act. The chapter shows the multiple levels on which the negotiations 
process allowed the ANC to continue to delay developing land policy that would have been both 
implementable and satisfactory to its constituents. The ANC’s political prioritization of 
economic stability and preventing violence led it to agree to enshrine a protection of property 
rights in the Constitution—an outcome it had previously rejected. First, the ANC agreed to a 
stability-ensuring process in which an un-elected and non-proportionally representative body 
instituted constraints, through an Interim Bill of Rights, on the later Constitutional Assembly’s 
ability to construct a final constitution. Due to this, the NP retained a disproportionate impact on 
the work of the Constitutional Assembly and was able to negotiate a property clause that 
reflected its constituents’ interest, namely the protection of property rights for white South 
Africans in the Interim Constitution. The result was a constitutional property clause containing 
the opposing objectives of protecting existing land rights and redistributing land equitably. 
Unable to institute an acceptable balance between these two in the constitution, the ANC instead 
created a court system to balance the two constitutionally protected interests on a case-by-case 
basis—the Land Claims Court (LCC). Ironically, once in power, the ANC did not exploit the 
potential for possible expropriation it had negotiated.   
The third chapter compares the ANC’s market-based land reform policy following the 
transition with Constitutional Court interpretations of Section 25 to show that the negotiated 
clause allowed a wide range of policies to be constitutionally implemented. Dispossessed people 
found success only through bringing claims to the Constitutional Court that had failed in the 
lower levels of the ANC’s land reform system. The ANC’s political choice to rely on market 
transactions limited a program of state involvement and made individuals responsible for 
 11 
pushing their cases all the way to the Constitutional Court. Constitutional Court decisions 
criticized the LCC’s limited interpretation of the clause and the Restitution Act. This chapter 
explores the various constraints in implementing land reform: the WBO, commercial agriculture, 
institutional constraints, and goal of ensuring stability. Only after twenty years of ineffective 
policy, in 2019, threats to the ANC’s political hegemony drove the leadership towards promises 
to amend Section 25.        
Together, the three chapters point to the conclusion that stalled land reform in South 
Africa is not because of an ineffective clause but because of the political tensions within the 
ANC, between the ANC and NP, and between the ANC leadership and its constituents. This 
history of the politics and laws of land rights in South Africa shows that only local activism and 
political will, not a new clause, will drive reform.
Chapter One 
 
Retreat from Nationalization: The Development of ANC Land Policy Before Formal 
Negotiations 
 
The lack of effective land distribution after the end of apartheid is notable given the 
founding principles of the African National Congress (ANC)— the precursor to the ANC party 
formed largely in response to early National Party (NP) racially discriminatory land policies. In 
the early 20th century, the ANC leadership recognized that restricting land rights would lead to 
restricted political and human rights. This proved true as the NP based its escalating project of 
racial segregation and oppression in the mid 20th century on denying black South Africans 
ownership of land and deporting them to designated reserves. In response, the ANC amassed 
popular support as a liberation movement calling for revolutionary redistribution of land. In this 
chapter, I trace how, despite these core commitments to land rights, the ANC leadership’s focus 
on land rights became diluted as formal negotiations approached in the early 1990s and the 
ANC’s central priority became a stable transition to democracy.  
As formal negotiations loomed, due to internal divergences, the ANC failed to develop a 
cohesive strategy for land reform that matched their constituents’ expectations of restitutive 
justice. At the same time, the NP developed and implemented a reform agenda in an attempt to 
appease ANC and international criticism while protecting white property owners’ rights. The 
ANC rejected the NP’s proposals, but the ANC leadership struggled to agree on an alternative. 
By the 1990s, the economic and political experts in the ANC did not see earlier promises of 
state-led broad redistribution, specifically the communist-influenced 1955 Freedom Charter, as 
feasible. Therefore, entering formal negotiations, no coherent vision existed not only between the 
land reform strategies of the NP and the ANC but also among various members of the ANC and 
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between the ANC leadership and its constituents. These multiple levels of disconnect later 
weakened the ANC’s negotiating power in developing Section 25.  
 
The Land Laws of Apartheid  
 
 Laws governing land rights and access underpinned the apartheid era and allowed the 
minority white population to remain in control of the majority black population. The 
implementation of racially based segregation preceded the start of formal apartheid rule in 1948. 
The apartheid government built upon earlier laws which forced black people onto small, 
unproductive plots of land. These areas were then used as labor pools as black farmers and 
laborers could not support themselves on the land they occupied. Instead, they had to seek 
outside employment.  
 Precedents to apartheid included the Natives Land Act of 1913 which restricted black 
South Africans, who at the time composed 67 percent of the population, to seven percent of 
arable land. 1 Under the Natives Land Act, black people were no longer allowed to buy land 
outside the proclaimed boundaries of the reserves. Black people who did not live on the reserves 
lost any previous economic freedom as cash tenants or sharecroppers and were forced to become 
labor tenants or wage workers on white owned land. 
From the Natives Land Act of 1913 to the beginning of legal apartheid in 1948, through 
various acts, commissions, and studies, the government promised to expand the amount of land 
allotted to the reserves. These promises of expansion were ultimately political tools to quiet 
                                                 
1 Laurine Platzky and Cherryl Walker, The Surplus People: Forced Removals in South Africa 
(Braamfontein: Ravan Press, 2017): 84; Anthony Christopher, “A South African Domesday 
Book: the First Union Census of 1911,” South African Geographical Journal 92 no. 1 (2010): 
25. 
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resistance while continuing the subjugation of black people through land deprivation. The 
Development Trust and Land Act of 1936 purported to increase land for the reserves, but in 
implementation the additional land was already included in the reserves designation and it 
nullified the voting rights of black residents in the reserves.2 The Development Trust and Land 
Act also created the South African Development Trust (SADT). The SADT controlled all state-
owned land and oversaw all land transactions involving black South Africans. The effect of this 
was to bar black South Africans from participation in private land markets.  
Under formal apartheid, the government created racial groups of white, colored, Indian, 
and African people. 3 With these classifications established, the government further divided 
access to land by race. The 1950 Group Areas Act made it mandatory for people to live only in 
areas assigned to their race group. Those not of the assigned race group were removed. The 
government passed the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act in 1951, the Reservation of Separate 
Amenities Act in 1953, and the Trespass Act in 1959. All of these facilitated the removal of 
black South Africans to designated land reserves and restricted them from moving freely in non-
designated areas.4 
Ultimately, the apartheid government sought a system in which black people lost 
citizenship to white South Africa and instead became citizens of self-governing black 
‘homelands.’  The first Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 laid the groundwork for the increased 
authority of traditional structures of power within the existing reserves. The subsequent Bantu 
Self-Government Act of 1959 and Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act of 1970 created the ethnic-
                                                 
2 See also: Beaumont Commission, Natives Administration Act of 1927, Platzky and Walker, 
Surplus People, 86-90. 
3 David Gordon, Apartheid in South Africa (Boston: Bedford/ St. Martin’s, 2017): 8.  
4 Catherine Coles, “Land Reform from Post-Apartheid South Africa,” Boston College 
Environmental Affairs Law Review 20 no.4 (August 1993): 714. 
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based ‘homelands’ and mandated that black South Africans live in their assigned area by 
revoking land ownership rights in white areas. Once black people were in the assigned areas, the 
government revoked their South African citizenship. The aim of the acts was to make black 
people citizens of the designated ‘homelands.’ To fulfill its commitment to ‘separate 
development,’ a euphemism for apartheid, the NP embarked on a project of forced removals and 
reserve consolidation. Black people were required to carry identification passes in white areas. 
The pass requirements also forced black people to stay with their white employers or face 
deportation or imprisonment.  
To justify the deportations of 3.5 million people between 1960 and 1982, the NP framed 
the Bantustans as a return to true homelands and traditional leadership as well as a chance for 
development.5 The Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act of 1971 provided for the creation of 
legislative assemblies within the reserves. Like the Bantu acts before it, the grants of political 
self-control came in tandem with increased dispossession. The Citizenship Act required that 
black residents obtain special permission to continue living in their own family homes in urban 
areas.6 The NP government ultimately envisioned the Bantustans as small, self-governing states. 
In reality, black people were forced off their ancestral lands to overcrowded reserves where they 
were governed by chiefs whose position often depended on their collaboration with the NP.7  
In 1979, facing increasing global condemnation and economic sanctions, P.W. Botha, the 
leader of the NP Government, told his followers the apartheid regime must “adapt or die.”8 
Under President Botha, in the mid 1980s the National Party began to reform apartheid 
                                                 
5 Gordon, Apartheid, 18.  
6 Platzky and Walker, Surplus People, 125. 
7 Gordon, Apartheid, 10-11.  
8 PW Botha, “Address by State President,” Natal Congress Durban August 15, 1985.  
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legislation. Reform was also driven by a split within the NP. By the early 1980s, the party 
membership was divided between elite business men and working-class Afrikaners. The elite 
group favored an end to strict segregation due to their own business interest in using black labor. 
Some elites became ideologically disillusioned with the apartheid project as well.9 Botha 
represented the elite group within the party and his election in 1978 demonstrated the dominance 
of elite interests in the NP agenda. In 1982 Botha’s government announced their plans for a new 
constitution and government which included political representation for Colored and Indian 
people in a tri-cameral parliament system. The new constitution triggered a split within the NP 
and 23 parliament members left the party to establish the new, far right Conservative Party.10  
 
The National Party’s Land Reform  
 Throughout the mid 1980s, the NP government repealed many of the laws that 
dispossessed black land owners and restricted their movement and territories. However, the 
repeals did not redress the effects of forced removals nor did they redistribute land. The reforms 
proposed by the NP did not go so far as to threaten the property rights of their white constituents; 
rather, they sought to enshrine those rights. In that way, the NP tried to prevent any real 
revolutionary redistribution under any future post-apartheid government.  
 The first significant round of repeals of discriminatory policies occurred during the 1986-
1989 government-ordered state of emergency. During this period violence and protest increased 
in predominantly black areas. In 1986, the government passed the Restoration of South African 
                                                 
9 Hermann Giliomee, The Afrikaners: Biography of a People (Charlottesville: University of 
Virginia Press, 2003): 607. 
10 Craig Charney, “Class Conflict and the National Party Split,” Journal of Southern African 
Studies 10 no. 2 (April 1984): 273. 
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Citizenship Act with the intention to bring those living in the Bantustans back into the South 
African state. In implementation, this act mainly affected those living in urban areas or in areas 
where black people lived illegally, called ‘black spots.’11 By 1990, frustration with the 
illegitimacy of the Bantustan leadership and desire for reincorporation into South Africa drove 
widespread violence within the Bantustans.12  
ANC members and their supporters contended that the NP’s reform project was meant to 
suppress the growing power of the anti-apartheid movement. ANC supporters protested the 
continued exclusion of black people from political representation in the 1983 constitution. ANC 
member Zola Skweyiya argued that members of the NP accomplished their goal of suppressing 
black voter participation because they used the new Constitution to deprive black citizens of 
equitable land:  
in order for the new constitution to function, there must be laws and institutions which 
fragment the land areas of South Africa into racially determined residential areas, such as 
the Group Areas Act, and the ‘homelands’ which define the African majority as non-
citizens of SA. Without the homelands, the exclusion of the Africans from the 
constitutional process has no justification or foundations.”13 
 
Anti-apartheid activists also fundamentally denied legitimacy to any constitution or government 
based on the racial division and oppression of South Africans. The Bantustans were a clear 
symbol of continuing inequity despite nominal political reform. 
The mid-1980s repeals were haphazard and meant to quell violence. In 1989, after a 
stroke, Botha resigned the presidency to F.W. de Klerk. By 1991, under de Klerk, the NP put 
forth a White Paper on their new position on land rights; they also put forth five repeal bills. In 
the 1991 White Paper, the NP government claimed that land was “a basic common resource to 
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all the people of this country” and that “every person has certain basic needs with regard to land, 
access to it and the use of it.”14 Nevertheless, these acknowledgements did not lead the 
government to consider or implement programs of redistribution or reform. Instead, the stated 
objective of the government’s reform plan was “ensuring that existing security and existing 
patterns of community order will be maintained” and “offer[ing] equal opportunities for the 
acquisition, use and enjoyment of land to all the people within the social and economic realities 
of the country” through a system of “private enterprise and private ownership.”15 While the 
acknowledgement of land as a basic and shared resource among the people of South Africa was a 
radical idea for the NP, their ensuing policies focused on bringing the Bantustans back under the 
control of the central government and the repeal of explicitly racist legislation.16 In the White 
Paper, the NP specifically opposed expropriating land to return it to previous black owners. 
Instead, the government planned to promote accessibility for all races to purchase publicly and 
privately held land.17 
 Along with the White Paper, the NP tabled five bills. The bills repealed the majority of 
apartheid land laws. These bills were the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Bill, the 
Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Bill, the Residential Environment Bill, the Less Formal 
Township Establishment Bill, and the Rural Development Bill. Following debate, the parliament 
rescinded the Residential Environment and Rural Development bills.18 The Abolition of Racially 
Based Land Measures bill repealed key apartheid legislation including the Natives Land Act of 
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1913, the Development Trust and Land Act of 1936, the Black Communities Development Act 
of 1984, and the Group Areas Act of 1966. The Abolition Act also established the Advisory 
Commission on Land Allocation. This commission advised the President on land suitable for 
agricultural development and for providing access to the landless.19 These bills formed the 
reform agenda of the NP. The NP passed new land rights laws without proposing measures to 
rectify the unequal distribution of land that their now repealed policies had created.   
 Despite the repeal of apartheid legislation, the ANC still rejected the reform agenda in the 
White Paper. The ANC argued the reforms were a minimal effort to equalize land access and a 
mask for the NP’s true purpose of protecting white land rights. Furthermore, equal access to land 
could not redress the damage of systematic dispossession. The proposals in the White Paper 
failed to demonstrate government or individual accountability or apology for apartheid policies. 
The policies also failed to propose methods of actively equalizing disparate distribution. The 
land identified by the Commission remained under government control and was primarily land 
the state already owned. In the system proposed in the White Paper, government ministers could 
select undesirable land for black people; however, black people could not claim the land that was 
deprived of them by apartheid laws. The NP had no intention of expropriating land and did not 
intend to interfere with land markets. The NP, characterizing its own program as one of 
development, granted government officials wide powers to subsidize certain “productive” land 
use.20 Under the new NP land policy, development replaced explicit racism as the government’s 
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justification for its policies. Despite the new justification, the policies still created unequal land 
allocation by race.21  
 The ANC was clear in its rejection of the White Paper proposals, but it struggled to 
develop its own cohesive and actionable land policy. As the NP made reforms and proposals in 
an attempt to protect its interests during the transition, the ANC tried to resolve internal 
disagreement about the possibility and potential of the expropriation and nationalization of land.   
 
SANNC and Early ANC Land Policy 
 Early in the 20th century, the South African Native National Congress (SANNC), the 
precursor to the ANC, formulated cohesive policy largely in response to early land dispossession 
laws. Over the course of the century, the ANC transformed from a party of middle-class 
professionals seeking equal access to land to a liberation movement influenced by African 
nationalism and communism. 
 In 1914, the SANNC sent a delegation to meet with the British Secretary of the Colonies 
in London. The delegation did not challenge British rule over South Africa, but it issued a 
petition to the King arguing that the Natives Land Act of 1913 was a first step towards 
disenfranchisement for Africans. The SANNC accepted the concept of racial division of land yet 
demanded distribution be made on equal terms in proportion to the number of blacks and whites 
in the population.22 In 1916, the SANNC again protested the Natives Land Act and published a 
document of resolutions describing it as a means of subjugating African laborers:  
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To deprive the Natives as a people of their freedom to acquire more land in their 
own right: To restrict or limit their right to bargain mutually on even terms for the 
occupation of or settlement on land: To reduce by gradual process and by artificial 
means the Bantu people as a race to a status of permanent labourers or subordinates 
for all purposes and for all times with little or no freedom to sell their labour by 
bargaining on even terms with employers in the open markets of labour either in 
the agricultural or industrial centres. To limit all opportunities for their economic 
improvement and independence: To lessen their chances as a people of competing 
freely and fairly in all commercial enterprises.23 
 
The SANNC rejected the Act and argued “there should be no interference with the existing 
conditions and vested rights of the Natives, and there should be no removal or ejectment of them 
from their ancestral lands or from lands they have occupied for generations past: but they should 
have unrestricted liberty in every Province to acquire land wherever and whenever opportunity 
permits.”24 At this stage, the SANNC focused on the protection of black land owners’ existing 
rights rather than on redistribution. Later, as apartheid ramped up, the ANC became a mass 
liberation movement rather than a group of black elites seeking to protect their land holdings. 
The resolutions demonstrate an early understanding of the long term aims and effects of 
apartheid land legislation; they encapsulated the SAANC’s view that protecting political and 
economic rights began with protecting land rights. 
In May 1923, the SANNC, influenced by growing African nationalist ideas, stated “the 
declaration by Parliament that the Black man, the man of African descent and origin has no right 
to ownership of land in this, an African, land, and that only the man of European origin has 
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landed rights in this, a non-European country, is injustice of the grossest magnitude.”25 The 
SANNC changed its name to the African National Congress (ANC) and declared, as part of a 
proposed Bill of Rights: “(I) That the Bantu inhabitants of the Union have, as human beings, the 
indisputable right to a place of abode in this land of their fathers. (2) That all Africans have, as 
the sons of this soil, the God-given right to unrestricted ownership of land in this, the land of 
their birth.”26 Along with African nationalism, in this era, the communist-influenced view of 
collective land-rights gained influence within the ANC.  
The South African Communist Party (SACP) officially formed in July 1921.27 From its 
inception, the party recognized the centrality of land distribution in motivating a proletariat 
revolution. A few years later, the Communist International (Comintern) reflected on the primacy 
of land issues to the development of the SACP:  
South Africa is a black country, the majority of its population is black and so is the 
majority of the workers and peasants. The bulk of the South African population is 
the black peasantry, whose land has been expropriated by the white minority. Seven 
eighths of the land is owned by whites. Hence the national question in South Africa, 
which is based upon the agrarian question lies at the foundation of the revolution 
in South Africa.28 
 
The SACP identified the root of working-class oppression as the racial dispossession of land.  
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By 1943, the ANC surpassed the SANNC’s early commitment to protecting existing 
black land rights and committed to redistribution. In an updated proposed Bill of Rights, the 
ANC reiterated its rejection of the Natives Land Act and called for change: 
1. That the present allocation of 12½% of the surface area to 7,000,000 Africans as 
against 87¼% to about 2,000,000 Europeans is unjust and contrary to the interest 
of South Africa, and therefore demand a fair redistribution of the land as a 
prerequisite for a just settlement of the land problem. 
2. That the right to own, buy, hire or lease and occupy land individually or 
collectively, both in rural and in urban areas is a fundamental right of citizenship, 
and therefore demand the repeal of the Native Land Act, the Native Trust and Land 
Act, the Natives Laws Amendment Act, and the Natives (Urban Areas) Act in so 
far as these laws abrogate that right.29 
 
At this point, the ANC’s definition of ‘just’ land reform was becoming grounded in tangible 
redistribution of land. The ANC expanded upon the idea of redistribution in the 1955 Freedom 
Charter.  
 The ANC published the Freedom Charter in June 1955 at the Congress of the People. The 
document represented the views not only of the ANC but also of the SACP and three other 
organizations.30 The document was edited and compiled by SACP member Rusty Bernstein. The 
purpose of the Congress of the People was to unite and articulate the opinions of the politically 
unrepresented as well as to connect the ANC with a wider base of supporters. Delegates came 
from all over South Africa. Leading up to the Congress, regional committees formed and 
communicated with local working-class people about their demands by going to trade union 
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meetings, churches, and even door to door.31 The nearly 3,000 delegates reflected the racial and 
socioeconomic demographics of the country. The Congress took place in the face of often hostile 
government control. Apartheid government police officers watched and frequently questioned 
participants. On the second day of the Congress, police surrounded, held at gun-point, and forced 
participants to reveal their names and addresses.32 The ANC President at the time, A.J. Lutuli 
commented on the significance of the event: 
Why will this assembly be significant and unique? Its size, I hope, will make it 
unique. But above all its multi-racial nature and its noble objectives will make it 
unique, because it will be the first time in the history of our multi-racial nation that 
its people from all walks of life will meet as equals, irrespective of race, colour and 
creed, to formulate a freedom charter for all people in the country.33 
 
The Freedom Charter, the document adopted by the Congress, laid out concrete demands for 
equality in South Africa. The Congress and process through which the Charter was created 
generated widespread publicity and attention. The document found a wide readership, and the 
position on land articulated in the Freedom Charter remained the ANC’s position in the mind of 
their constituents even as the ANC leadership would ultimately adopt different policies.  
On the subject of land, the Freedom Charter called for redistribution without delineating 
an actionable plan for how this ought to take place. “The land shall be shared among those who 
work it!” the charter declared. “Restrictions of land ownership on a racial basis shall be ended, 
and all the land re-divided amongst those who work it to banish famine and land hunger.”34 The 
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association between land redistribution and general equitable redistribution among the working 
class in this statement reflected the communist influence on the ANC’s land policy at the time.35 
The monumental nature of the Congress of the People and the ensuing political response 
solidified the fame of the Freedom Charter.  
After the Congress of the People, police seized delegates and imprisoned them on charges 
of treason. The government argued the Charter called for a violent overthrow of the government. 
The trial proceedings continued until 1961, when the court found the delegates were not planning 
to violently overthrow the government and freed them. Then, in April 1960, the government 
passed the Unlawful Organizations Act which allowed the government to label and ban unlawful 
organizations.36 A day after the passage of this Act, the government banned the ANC. From the 
1955 passage of the Freedom Charter to the ANC’s unbanning in 1990, land policy development 
as well as general party activities occurred underground or in exile. In exile, a disconnect 
developed as ANC supporters adhered to the Freedom Charter vision while the ANC 
leadership’s plans evolved.  
 
The ANC Develops Land Policy in Exile 
 Following the apartheid government’s 1960 ban of the party, ANC president Oliver 
Tambo sought to intensify the ANC’s attack on the NP government from exile. As a part of this 
effort, Tambo called for more radical land policies than those expressed in the Freedom Charter. 
However, by the mid-1980s, as prospects of a democratic transition became real, the ANC 
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focused less on land policy in general and retreated from explicit plans for nationalization. The 
unbanning of the ANC in 1990, the NP’s move towards meeting for talks about transition, 
combined with the fall of the Berlin Wall and sidelining of communist influences within the 
ANC, contributed to the its moderated stance on nationalization. By the start of Convention for a 
Democratic South Africa (CODESA) talks in November 1991, ANC leaders stated they did not 
support nationalization of land.  
 The ANC’s First National Consultative Conference occurred in Morogoro, Tanzania in 
April 1969.37 There, Tambo strategized for the overthrow of the apartheid government. His 
critique of the apartheid government was tied to anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist critiques. He 
also reflected on the tenets of the Freedom Charter and expanded upon each clause:38  
The bulk of the land in our country is in the hands of land barons, absentee 
landlords, big companies and state capitalist enterprises. The land must be taken 
away from exclusively European control and from these groupings and divided 
among the small farmers, peasants and landless of all races who do not exploit the 
labour of others. Farmers will be prevented from holding land in excess of a given 
area, fixed in accordance with the concrete situation in each locality. Lands held in 
communal ownership will be increased so that they can afford a decent livelihood 
to the people and their ownership shall be guaranteed. Land obtained from land 
barons and the monopolies shall be distributed to the landless and the land-poor 
peasants. State land shall be used for the benefit of all the people. Restrictions of 
land ownership on a racial basis shall be ended and all land shall be open to 
ownership and use to all people, irrespective of race.39 
 
Tambo laid out a more detailed approach to redistributing land based on the general call in the 
Freedom Charter for dividing it among those who work it. Tambo called for taking land from 
current property holders, implementing land holding ceilings, and ending the racial distribution 
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of land. This reflected the most detailed of the ANC’s plans for nationalization as well as the 
peak of communist influence.  
 From the Morogoro conference until the inception of informal talks between ANC 
leadership and NP government officials, Tambo’s Freedom Charter-based version of 
nationalization remained the ANC’s official and assumed position on land redistribution. But, 
some sections of the leadership had different ideas about how his vision would be realized. 
Communist members of the ANC planned for state ownership and control of the land, while 
other ANC officials devised plans within, what historian Ruth Hall describes as, the ANC’s 
characteristically ambiguous “notion of a society in transition from monopoly capitalism to 
socialism,” and faith in “a historical trajectory of change towards a more equitable and just 
society.”40 There was little consensus on details. In 1985, pro-communist thinkers, such as the 
ANC publication, Sechaba, writer Mzala, envisioned “collective farms… side by side with state 
farms to banish famine and land hunger.”41 A year later in April 1986, the ANC’s official stance 
presented to the National Union of South African Students was that “the ANC would advocate 
the nationalization and redistribution of farms owned by monopoly businesses, the land bank, 
and farming absentee landlords… [and that] nationalization would not be forced on the people 
but would have to be decided democratically by all South Africans.”42 
 The ANC’s deflection of the question of nationalization to a later, democratic decision, 
demonstrated a major shift occurring during the mid-1980s. The ANC moved from policy based 
in land reform to policy based in political inclusion. International and economic pressure pushed 
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the faltering NP to begin informal talks and pushed the ANC towards market-based neo-
liberalism as opposed to socialism. As the possibility of a democratic transition emerged, the 
ANC’s primary focus became democratic elections. As I will explain further in Chapter 2, this 
prioritization limited the ANC in later, formal talks. At this point, however, it allowed specific 
land policy to drop from a central focus and made the ANC’s official position on nationalization 
ambiguous both within the leadership and to outside analysts and constituents.  
 In February 1989, in Harare, Zimbabwe, members of the ANC discussed the 
Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa. These guidelines would be presented to 
the NP as part of the process of negotiating an end to apartheid. The ANC’s guidelines did not 
reflect the more radical opinions held by some ANC members about land redistribution and 
moved the ANC’s official policy towards protection of the existing system of distribution.43 The 
tepid land section of the guidelines reads: 
The state shall devise and implement a Land Reform Programme that will include 
and address the following issues:  
(i) Abolition of all racial restrictions on ownership and use of land.  
(ii) Implementation of land reforms in conformity with the principle of Affirmative 
Action, taking into account the status of victims of forced removals.44  
 
The guidelines described an economy that contained a public sector, a private sector, a co-
operative sector, and a small-scale family sector – a divergence from communist visions for the 
future South Africa. The ANC still critiqued “constitutional protection for group rights [that] 
would perpetuate the status quo and would mean that the mass of the people would continue to 
be constitutionally trapped in poverty and remain as outsiders in the land of their birth.”45 In 
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spite of this, the ANC now conceded that “[p]roperty for personal use and consumption shall be 
constitutionally protected.”46  
 The removal of land policy from center focus was not universal among ANC leaders. In 
the late 1980s, ANC exiles Bongiwe Njobe, Helena Dolny, and Heinz Klug established a group 
in Lusaka, Zambia, to follow and discuss land removals in South Africa as well as land policy 
options.47 Njobe later became the Director General of the national Department of Agriculture. 
Dolny went on to become an advisor to the Minister of Land Affairs. Klug joined the World 
Bank as a consultant. In 2005, Dolny said “up to the 1980s, I don’t think anyone had applied 
their minds to land issues in the ANC, at all.”48 The group sought to bring land issues back to the 
forefront of ANC policy discussions. In 1989, the group organized an ANC workshop on ‘The 
Land Question’ in Lusaka and invited ANC members from London, Zimbabwe, Amsterdam, and 
other exile locations.49 The group members, despite lamenting the lack of attention paid to land 
issues, believed the ambiguous calls for nationalization in the Freedom Charter remained the 
policy of the ANC.  
   After the publication and discussion of the ANC’s Constitutional Guidelines, the 
workshop organized by the Lusaka group of exiles convened in February 1990. On February 2nd, 
during this workshop, President De Klerk announced the unbanning of the ANC and other 
outlawed political parties in South Africa and the release of political prisoners. As a result, the 
workshop concluded with an agreement to form an ANC Land Commission in order to elevate 
the issue of land within the ANC as it entered formal negotiations.50 The ANC Land Commission 
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consisted of the original Lusaka members— Njobe, Klug, and Dolny as well as Derek Hanekom 
who went on to be Mandela’s Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs.  
 Once the ANC was unbanned, its first meeting concerning land policy was in March 
1990. The majority of the attendees were white academics and economists who were involved in 
NGO discussions concerning land policy in a future democratic South Africa. The only black 
person at the event was ANC representative Essy Letsoalo. The discussions there did not 
entertain nationalization as a realistic possibility. Instead, the favored policy was one of transfer 
from white commercial ownership to small, private black land owners.51 The lack of debate 
about nationalization was significant as it signaled that regardless of the ANC’s position on 
nationalization from outside of South Africa, experts within did not anticipate nationalization to 
be realistic even under ANC rule in a new democratic nation. These experts’ vision diverged 
even more significantly from the popular and revolutionary hopes of ANC followers for 
redistribution, as articulated in the Freedom Charter. 
In October 1990, the ANC Land Commission hosted a land workshop and invited a 
diverse group of NGOs, ANC representatives, and local academics. The ANC Land 
Commissioners, based on their own studies of the land distribution situation in South Africa, did 
not support nationalization. Instead, Dolny advocated for the regulation of land markets and 
Njobe sought a policy that prioritized transfer to black farmers.52 This stance became significant 
as the commissioners went on to occupy influential positions in shaping ANC land policy and in 
working with the World Bank on issues of land policy during and immediately following the 
transition to democracy.  
                                                 
51 Hall, “The Politics of Land Reform,” 135. 
52 Hall, “The Politics of Land Reform,” 136. 
 31 
On February 1, 1991, President De Klerk unexpectedly announced the 1913 Land Act 
would be repealed. By June, the NP repealed the majority of their discriminatory land policies. 
Also in June of 1991, the ANC held a national conference. On land issues, the ANC remained in 
an ambiguous space between two policy poles. Officially, it rejected the constitutional protection 
of property rights. The leader of the ANC’s Constitutional Committee, Zola Skweyiya, also 
rejected nationalization. He compared nationalization policies of “forced removals and 
confiscation” to the land distribution policies of the NP.53  
The split between ANC experts’ policies and those tenets of the Freedom Charter, which 
the party’s followers still espoused, would lead to a crisis of unmet expectations for the ANC. By 
November 1991, when the ANC and the NP began formal negotiations about a new democratic 
government, the Land Commission was engaged in devising a way to raise money to fund a 
system in which land owners were paid for expropriated land.54 ANC and NP policies on this 
issue were converging.   
 
Conclusions 
The beginnings of an overlap in ANC and NP land policy did not represent the start of an 
effective, united land reform program. The two parties came together around a shared desire for 
economic stability and a peaceful transition, but the ANC’s policy diverged from the hopes of 
their constituents. Furthermore, disagreements amongst the ANC leadership in terms of preferred 
land policy would lead to a divided and weakened stance on the land question during the formal 
negotiation process. The only true point of agreement between the ANC and its constituents was 
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that the current distribution was unjust and the NP’s reform proposals were inadequate. The only 
true point of agreement amongst the ANC leadership was that the land issue, along with many 
other issues, could be best resolved under a democratically-elected ANC government. While this 
may have been true, the ANC over-estimated their own power, or even the political will of a 
future ANC government, to effect land reform even in the new democracy.  
In the rest of this paper, I show how the ANC’s agreement to a constitutional protection 
of existing land rights and its market-based reform policies led to wide-spread distrust in the 
party in the 2000s. This distrust, and the ANC’s consequent precarious political position, 
originated in the disconnect between the ANC leaders’ increasingly neo-liberal plans for land 




Creating a Compromised Clause: The Multi-Step Negotiation Process 
 
 Following years of secret conversations between Nelson Mandela and President De Klerk 
beginning in the late 1980s, party leadership, primarily from the existing apartheid National 
Party (NP) government and the African National Congress (ANC), negotiated the terms of a 
transition to inclusive, democratic government in South Africa. In this process, both parties 
sacrificed some of their ideals to achieve a new government without full blown civil war or 
economic collapse. Key to preventing these outcomes was the inclusion of minority parties in 
constructing the new Constitution and government. The multi-step, stability-ensuring process of 
Constitution writing produced a compromised clause regarding land reform and redistribution.  
The negotiations occurred in three formal forums: the Convention for a Democratic South 
Africa (CODESA) in 1991-92, the Multi Party Negotiating Process (MPNP) in 1993-94, and the 
democratically elected Constitutional Assembly (CA) in 1994-96. However, throughout the 
process, secret, bilateral discussions between individual ANC and NP representatives, and 
between Mandela and De Klerk themselves, resolved many contentious issues. 
The series of constitutional negotiations set the parameters for land reform. The ANC 
agreed to a process in which an un-elected and non-proportionally representative body instituted 
constraints, through an Interim Bill of Rights, on the later Constitutional Assembly’s ability to 
construct a final constitution. Due to this, the NP retained a disproportionate impact on the work 
of the Constitutional Assembly and was able to negotiate a property clause that reflected their 
constituents’ interest, namely the protection of property rights for white South Africans in the 
Interim Constitution. Consequently, in the drafting of the final constitution, the ANC was limited 
in its goal of ensuring equitable redistribution of land by the already enshrined protection of 
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existing property rights. Despite their majority, the ANC could not prioritize its agenda over that 
of the NP. The result was a compromised constitutional property clause with the contradictory 
objectives of protecting existing land rights and redistributing land equitably. Unable to codify a 
balance between these two in the constitution, the ANC instead created a court system to weigh 
the two constitutionally protected interests on a case-by-case basis.  
 
Convention for a Democratic South Africa and the Record of Understanding 
The initial Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) debates were 
unsuccessful because ANC and NP representatives were unable to align their fundamental 
disagreements about the constitution-writing process and the scope of rights to be protected. The 
NP sought to enshrine expansive protections while the ANC desired only an outline of basic 
principles. The ANC viewed this stage as illegitimate because the participants were not elected 
and the negotiators’ power was not proportional to their support from the general population. 
Still, the ANC, led by Mandela, was committed to a new, united nation and recognized the 
necessity of compromise in constructing a constitutional democracy. In CODESA, the parties 
learned each other’s stances and realized fundamental sources of disagreement. From 
CODESA’s failure, negotiators garnered knowledge of the most contentious issues and 
experience in processes of deadlock-breaking and compromise. The history of the CODESA 
talks is important in explaining later agreements on the process of constitution writing and the 
final property clause. 
In December 1991, 400 representatives of 19 parties met to begin the CODESA talks. As 
articulated in the Declaration of Intent, the parties broadly committed to a free, nonracial, multi-
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party constitutional democracy with regular elections.1 They sought to establish a procedure for 
writing the constitution and the terms for governance during the transitional period. Topic-based 
working groups were to produce agreements to be debated upon and approved in a plenary 
section. While the groups did invite public comment, they lacked an effective system for 
distributing information to the public.2 The working groups distributed written position papers to 
the media before the final stage of debate and agreement, but this often served to entrench their 
different positions.3 This ineffective interaction with the public, as well as the absence of 
technical law and policy experts in the process, were among the lessons for the parties when they 
planned for subsequent stages of the constitutional negotiations.  
The working groups’ mandates were: the creation of a climate for free and fair elections; 
the creation of constitutional principles and instructions for a constitution-making body; advice 
on the structure of a transitional government; a plan for inclusion of Bantustan states; and the 
determination of time frames.4 Each group produced a report on agreements, with the exception 
of Working Group 2, which focused on constitutional principles. The constitutional principles 
group’s task was fraught from the beginning because different parties had vastly different 
expectations of its outcome. The ANC sought general agreements about basic principles at this 
stage but hoped to leave the majority of details about constitutional provisions to an elected 
committee. On the other hand, the NP and existing government sought to enshrine as many 
protections as possible at this non-representative stage so the ANC could not dominate the terms 
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of the agreements based on its majority support. This central impasse prevented Working Group 
2 from submitting a report.  
While debates stalled, activists, specifically the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU), pushed for a campaign of action and mass strikes to demonstrate the ANC’s power 
and therefore bolster its negotiating ability.5 COSATU played an integral role in persuading 
ANC negotiators to temporarily abandon the talks. On June 16, 1992 COSATU organized a mass 
strike. Yet it was a violent attack with suspected police aid against ANC supporters the following 
day that finally pushed CODESA’s disintegration.6 Mandela publicly suspended the talks and 
presented fourteen terms that the De Klerk government had to agree with in order to resume 
negotiations. These included a government of national unity, the termination of covert 
operations, suspension and prosecution of violent security force personnel and police officers, 
release of all political prisoners, and the repeal of repressive legislation.7 Despite the public 
suspension, Roelf Meyer, at the time the Minister of Defense for the government and a leading 
negotiator in CODESA, recalled that minutes after Mandela’s announcement, Cyril Ramaphosa, 
a leading ANC negotiator (who became President of South Africa in 2018) called him to 
schedule continuing private talks.8  
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 As violence had pushed the disintegration of CODESA, it also pushed the return to 
communications. On September 7, 1992, a violent outbreak at an ANC march left 28 dead. 9 The 
pressure to prevent further violence, along with Ramphosa and Meyer’s continuing bilateral 
communication, led Mandela and De Klerk to sign the Record of Understanding on September 
26, 1992. In his retrospective account, Meyer called the period between the dissolution of 
CODESA and the Record of Understanding crucial in establishing trusting interpersonal 
relationships among ANC and NP negotiators and allowing the NP to solidify its position that 
the transitional constitution ought to be a full constitution protecting individual rights, such as 
property rights.10  The Record of Understanding laid out, in broad terms, the steps to a 
democratic election and final constitution.11 The constitution-making body would be 
democratically elected and sit as a single chamber to draft the new document. It would be bound 
by a fixed time frame and equipped with deadlock-breaking mechanisms. Most importantly it 
would be bound by agreed-upon constitutional principles. The two parties agreed on the 
necessity of “constitutional continuity” and that an interim government would rule under a 
“constitutional framework/ transitional constitution” while it created the final constitution.12 
 In the fall of 1992, Joe Slovo, a leader of the South African Communist Party published 
an article asserting the necessity for compromise, because the ANC was not dealing with a 
“defeated enemy.”13 He argued that the ANC negotiators ought to be willing to make 
quantitative compromises on issues like timelines but not to make certain base line qualitative 
                                                 
9 Spitz and Chaskalson, The Politics of Transition, 29.  
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compromises. Slovo framed the negotiations as a step, not an ending, and argued that qualitative 
compromises would inhibit the future creation of non-racial democratic rule. Slovo also offered 
support for a “sunset” clause in the constitution that would allow for power-sharing for a set 
period of time following the adoption of a constitution.14 Slovo’s paper demonstrated that even 
radical members of the ANC were willing to make significant concessions in order to facilitate a 
transition to democracy. 
In February 1993, the ANC and NP agreed to an elected constitutional council, which 
would serve as the interim government— all parties that received a certain threshold of votes 
would be represented. Called the Government of National Unity, it was to serve for five years 
from the time of election.15 In their retrospective accounts, both Roelf Meyer and Cyril 
Ramaphosa highlight the agreement regarding a Government of National Unity as 
groundbreaking in the ANC and NP bilateral negotiations.16 This agreement, in February 1993, 
was crucial in bringing the two parties back to formal talks. Ramaphosa called the sunset clauses 
“among the key concessions made by the ANC in negotiations, and arguably paved the way for a 
settlement and the peaceful transition.” The clauses “required the ANC to consider the kind of 
broad strategic concessions it was prepared to make, and needed to make, to achieve a resolution 
which could lead to a democratic South Africa.”17           
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Before the election for the Government of National Unity, a Multi-Party Negotiating 
Process would create an Interim Constitution. This two-step process, lauded as a solution to the 
problems of instability and illegitimacy, affected the opportunity for land reform because the 
Interim Constitutional would be written before the election and it would be binding on the later 
constitutional writing process. The ANC’s acceptance of continuity allowed guidelines created 
by a body that was not representative of the majority to set the terms for construction of the final 
constitution. The two-step process set forth in the Record of Understanding was paramount in 
preventing violence and establishing a political climate of constitutional respect. On the other 
hand, the Interim Constitution restricted the ANC’s power in later negotiations over the 
constitutional property clause. The Record of Understanding created a system in which a non-
elected coalition, in which the NP had a bargaining power disproportionate to the power it would 
have after the election, established key constitutional limits for property reform.  
CODESA broke down because of a fundamental disagreement over the constitution-
writing process. The ANC wanted constitutional provisions concerning land reform to be written 
after the election, and the NP sought to preserve a constitutional right to property before the 
ANC won a majority in the election. Nevertheless, the threat of violence and desire to move the 
transition along led the ANC to compromise. Because of the goal of stability, the Record of 
Understanding and the Multi-Party Negotiating Process gave the NP disproportionate power, and 
the resulting Interim Constitution created boundaries for the later democratically elected 
Constitutional Assembly. This restriction happened primarily through the inclusion, against the 
ANC’s wishes, of an extensive Bill of Rights in the Interim Constitution.   
 
The Multi-Party Negotiating Process and the Interim Constitution 
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 The Multi-Party Negotiating Process (MPNP) employed non-partisan technical 
committees to facilitate political agreement in constructing an Interim Constitution. The concept 
of non-political advice demonstrated a strong commitment towards reaching compromise. In its 
commitment to compromise in order to progress towards democratic elections, the ANC 
ultimately accepted the technical committee’s recommendation of including binding 
constitutional principles and a Bill of Rights in the Interim Constitution. This, like the acceptance 
of the two-step process of negotiating an Interim Constitution before writing the final 
Constitution, set the parameters for the content of the final property clause. The result of the 
MPNP was that agreements about constitutional property protection and redistribution were 
negotiated in a forum in which the NP had disproportionate power.  
In March 1993, formal talks resumed in the new MPNP format. The MPNP was the first 
step in the two- step transition to democracy laid out in the Record of Understanding. This time, 
the negotiation structure, adapted from the failures of CODESA, consisted of technical 
committees instead of working groups. The technical committees were composed of five to six 
technical experts whose role was to be non-partisan.18 There were seven technical committees in 
total. These committees were meant to identify areas of agreement and dissent between 
submissions from the different parties as well as from the CODESA reports and therefore 
facilitate negotiations towards an interim constitution. Unlike in CODESA, where the sub-groups 
encouraged political debate on this issue, in the MPNP, the technical committees sought 
primarily to identify areas of agreement and prevent deadlock.  
The technical committee on fundamental rights was given the mandate to prepare a Bill 
of Rights that would guide and rule during the interim period. The group was tasked with 
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creating a compromise between the two main parties’ positions that would be tabled for approval 
by the entire MPNP. The committee was not to discuss particular constitutional principles but 
rather to provide documents to facilitate MPNP discussion by identifying areas of agreement and 
dissent from the parties’ submitted proposals. Yet, unsurprisingly due to the deadlock in the 
CODESA working group over this question, the two main parties did not agree on whether an 
Interim Constitution should include an extensive protection and definition of rights like the right 
to property.  
The technical committee on fundamental rights addressed the point of dissent between 
the ANC and non-majority parties: the ANC refused a constitution created by an unelected party 
while the minority parties feared that a constitution drawn up by an elected party would reflect 
only the interests of the majority and would not include protections for minorities. The technical 
committee decided that the key to moving forward was the creation, at this stage, of 
constitutional principles that would guide the later elected body.19 These principles had three 
criteria: “The principles should provide a clear framework for the drafting and adoption of a 
future Constitution. The principles should not have the character of constitutional provisions as 
such, but they should establish clear parameters within which a future Constitution must be 
drafted. The principles must be formulated in clear language which is capable of effective 
judicial interpretation and adjudication.”20 
The MPNP was part of the process outlined in the Record of Understanding. The purpose 
of the MPNP was to create an interim constitution containing the constitutional principles that 
                                                 
19 Technical Committee on Constitutional Issues, “Second Report of the Technical Committee on 
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would guide the later elected Constitutional Assembly in writing the Constitution. Then the 
Constitutional Court, established by the Interim Constitution, would certify the final document to 
ensure its adherence to the principles. In total, the Interim Constitution contained thirty-four 
constitutional principles.21 The principles mandated that “everyone shall enjoy all universally 
accepted fundamental rights… provided for and protected by entrenched and justiciable 
provisions in the Constitution, which shall be drafted after having given due consideration to 
inter alia the fundamental rights contained in Chapter 3 of this Constitution.”22 The ANC 
therefore was unable to delay a comprehensive definition and protection of constitutional rights 
until after democratic elections. 
Roelf Meyer argues that, in this arrangement, the NP got “even more than they had hoped 
for, namely a two-phased process in which, firstly, an Interim constitution would be written and 
approved by the MPNP and, secondly, the negotiators could decide beforehand on the 
Constitutional Principles to which the new Constitution had to conform.”23 The agreements 
reached in the MPNP necessitated that the ANC cooperate with the NP over the content of the 
property clause in a forum where the NP had strength disproportionate to its percentage of the 
electorate.  
 
The Property Clause in the Interim Constitution 
With the decision that the interim constitution would include a full Bill of Rights and 
would bind the final constitution, that the ANC and NP were forced to reconcile their 
conceptions of a property clause. The NP’s proposal read: 
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18(1) Every person shall have the right, individually or with others, to acquire, possess, 
enjoy, use and dispose of, including disposal by way of testamentary disposition or intestate 
succession, any form of movable and immovable property. 
(2) Subject to the provisions of subsection (3) no person shall be deprived of his property 
otherwise than under a judgment or order of a court of law. 
(3) Property may be expropriated for public purposes, subject to the payment within a 
reasonable time of an agreed compensation or, failing such an agreed compensation, of 
compensation in cash determined by a court of law according to the market value of the 
property. 
(4) Every person shall have the right not to be subjected to taxes on property which will 
have a confiscatory effect or will make unreasonable inroads upon the enjoyment, use or 
value of such property.24 
 
This expansive protection of property rights prohibited any deprivation of property without a 
court order, required that any expropriation be compensated for at market value, and barred 
“unreasonable” property taxes. This proposal offered no path to land redistribution or redress for 
apartheid land inequalities.  
In sharp contrast, the ANC’s conception of the property clause echoed some aspects of 
the goals of nationalization and redistribution first expressed in the Freedom Charter, described 
in Chapter 1.  
13 (4) The taking of property shall only be permissible according to law and in the public 
interest, which shall include the achievement of the objectives of the Constitution. 
(5) Any such taking shall be subject to just compensation which shall be determined by 
establishing an equitable balance between the public interest and the interest of 
those affected. 
(6) In the case of a dispute regarding compensation, provision shall be made for 
recourse to a special independent tribunal, with an appeal to the Courts. 
(7) Legislation on economic matters shall be guided by the principle of encouraging 
collaboration between the public, private, co-operative, communal and small-scale family 
sectors with a view to reducing inequality, promoting growth and providing 
goods and services for the whole population. 
(12) Rights to Land 
(3) South Africa belongs to all who live in it. 
(4) Access to land or other living space is the birthright of all South Africans. 
(5) No-one shall be removed from his or her home except by order of a Court, which 
shall take into account the existence of reasonable alternative accommodation. 
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(6) Legislation shall provide that the system of administration, ownership, occupation, use 
and transfer of land is equitable, directed at the provision of adequate housing for the whole 
population, promotes productive use of land and provides for stable 
and secure tenure.25 
 
The ANC sought the property clause to serve as legislation that would if not enable, at the very 
least not preclude, the option for state intervention in land reform and redistribution. The ANC 
property clause reflected an underlying understanding of the need for reform and redistribution. 
The ANC focused on reform for the good of the majority of the population rather than 
emphasizing the protection of existing ownership. The proposal further detailed a plan for 
establishing a tribunal to facilitate land reform. 
(7) Legislation shall provide for the establishment of a tribunal for land claims which 
shall have the power to adjudicate upon land claims made on legal or equitable grounds, 
and in particular shall have: 
(a) the power to order the restoration of land to people dispossessed by forced 
removals, or where appropriate to direct that compensation be paid, or other 
suitable acknowledgement be made, for injury done to them; 
(b) the power to award particular portions of land, or rights to land, to such 
claimants where there are special circumstances arising out of use, occupation or 
other similar grounds, which make it equitable for such an award to be made. 
(8) Legislation shall also make provision for access to affordable land to be given as far 
as possible, and with due regard to financial and other resources available to the state, to 
those historically deprived of land and land rights, or deprived of access to land by past 
statutory discrimination...26 
The ANC aimed to create a body that could both restore land and determine a form of 
compensation besides market value for expropriated land. The ANC’s ideal that compensation 
for expropriated land would reflect historical wrongdoing and a commitment to restorative 
justice was absent from the NP’s objectives. 
 Unable to align the proposals of the two parties through technical committees, the MPNP 
formed an Ad Hoc Committee on Fundamental Rights, which met first in August 1993 to 
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negotiate those rights unresolved in the negotiating council.27 At this time, the most recent clause 
draft was: 
(1) Every person shall have the right to acquire, hold and dispose of rights in 
property.  
(2) Expropriation of property by the State shall be permissible in the public interest 
and shall be subject either to agreed compensation or, failing agreement, to 
compensation to be determined by a court of law as just and equitable, taking into 
account all relevant factors, including the use to which the property is being put, 
the history of its acquisition, its market value, the value of the owner's investment 
in it and the interests of those affected.  
(3) Nothing in this section shall preclude measures aimed at restoring rights in land 
to or compensating persons who have been dispossessed of rights in land as a 
consequence of any racially discriminatory policy, where such restoration or 
compensation is feasible. 
 
Instead of resolving the dispute at the heart of the ANC and NP’s different proposals, this clause 
included both protection of property rights and expropriation for the public interest. It included 
sections of both parties’ proposed clauses, yet, as their visions for the goal of land reform stood 
diametrically opposed, it remained unsatisfactory to both.   
The key concession at this stage was the NP’s acknowledgement that factors other than 
market price could be considered in determining the compensation due. These other factors were 
“the use to which the property is being put, the history of its acquisition,” “the value of the 
owner’s investment in it and the interests of those affected.” The NP’s Minister of Justice refused 
to accept a property clause that did not include mention of market price as a factor in 
determining compensation, yet he did not object to market price as one in a list of factors. 
Representatives, including those ranging from the National Party to the South African 
Communist Party and the Chief Justice of the Judiciary criticized the use of this list of subjective 
and quantitative factors for determining “just” price as unspecific and likely to cause uneven 
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application. Despite these critiques, the negotiators included the list as it presented a compromise 
and resolved a major discrepancy between the two parties’ initial clause proposals.28   
Property was not the only remaining unsolved fundamental right. Moreover, the five 
members of the Ad Hoc committee representing the South African Communist Party, ANC, 
Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa, NP, and the Democratic Party were not 
selected for particular experience in property law or land issues.29 Due to this, their debates and 
ultimate acceptance of the final clause did not meaningfully rectify the fundamental 
disagreements between the two parties about the degree to which the clause was supposed to 
encourage land reform or protect the existing distribution.30  
The MPNP agreed to the Interim Constitution on January 25, 1994. The property clause 
was solidified after a bilateral agreement between the ANC and NP outside of the ongoing 
negotiations in the Ad Hoc committee. On October 25-26 1993, the two parties met to resolve 
final issues over a policing clause and the term “rights in property.” The ANC wanted the clause 
to read rights in property not just to property in an attempt to protect communal land holdings. 
The NP initially feared this would have the effect of creating a broad understanding of ownership 
and protecting squatters’ rights. The ANC refused to make concessions on this term. Sub 
sections 2 and 3 were adjusted to ensure that with this new phrase, the government would not 
later be forced to compensate individuals who could claim they lost a broader right in property 
due to legislation.31 Subsection 3 thus created a distinction between deprivation and 
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expropriation with only the latter qualifying for compensation. The final interim constitution 
property clause read: 
Section 28: (1) Every person shall have the right to acquire and hold rights in property and, 
to the extent that the nature of the rights permits, to dispose of such rights.  
(2) No deprivation of any rights in property shall be permitted otherwise than in accordance 
with a law.  
(3) Where any rights in property are expropriated pursuant to a law referred to in sub-
section (2), such expropriation shall be permissible for public purposes only and shall be 
subject to the payment of agreed compensation or, failing agreement, to the payment of 
such compensation and within such period as may be determined by a court of law as just 
and equitable, taking into account all relevant factors, including, in the case of the 
determination of compensation, the use to which the property is being put, the history of 
its acquisition, its market value, the value of the investments in it by those affected and the 
interests of those affected.32 
 
While closing the option for radical state redistribution as outlined in the initial ANC 
proposal for a property clause, the final interim property clause did, in broad terms, allow a 
system of state rectification of dispossession. Cyril Ramaphosa wrote that the imperfections in 
the Interim Constitution were due, in part, to “an effort to accommodate those forces whose 
cooperation was necessary to ensure a smooth transition.”33 He called the NP’s agenda for 
property rights part of a “desire to maintain through the Constitution some of the privileges and 
inequalities that had characterized apartheid.” Ramaphosa viewed the final Interim clause as a 
compromise with the NP that did not guarantee the right to property but “limited the 
circumstances under which property could be expropriated.”34  
Importantly, the MPNP never reached an agreement on the substantive process for 
expropriation. Therefore, the ANC was later limited to the terms of the Interim Constitution 
without a political agreement on how to determine and facilitate feasible compensation and 
restitution. In this way, the MPNP and the two-stage process limited the content of the property 
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clause and the process of land reform. The concession of extensive definition and protection of 
rights in the Interim Constitution meant the ANC could not later redefine property rights in a 
way that represented the majority of citizens’ interests.  
Three central disagreements in the MPNP debates remained unresolved in the Interim 
Constitution: how to determine property ownership and protect communal property rights, the 
circumstances under which expropriation was appropriate, and the just compensation for 
expropriation. Because the final constitution was limited by the agreements in the Interim 
Constitution, these questions remained largely unanswered in the final constitutional clause as 
well. Instead, the clause balanced the opposing interests of the ANC and NP by listing factors the 
court ought to consider in deciding these issues. The ambiguity of this list allowed both sides to 
accept the clause but created a system in which the court had the difficult task of applying a 
balancing test between two opposing objectives to determine just solutions on a case-by-case 
basis.  
 
The Constitutional Assembly and the Final Constitution 
The second phase of the two-stage constitution writing process was the democratically 
elected Constitutional Assembly (CA) drafting a final constitution. The elections occurred in 
April 1994, and, despite violence leading up to the elections, an independent electoral 
commission found them to be free and fair. Four hundred representatives were elected to the 
national assembly by proportional representation. Ninety senators were elected to the senate, 
with ten from each of the nine provinces. The joint sitting of these two parliamentary bodies 
constituted the CA, which was run by President Nelson Mandela.35  
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Within the CA, 44 members, proportionally representing the parties, were chosen for a 
constitutional committee. Cyril Ramaphosa of the ANC and Leon Wessels of the NP served as 
chairman and deputy chairman, respectively, of both the constitutional committee and its twenty-
member subcommittee. Six other sub-committees were established based on themes and each 
assigned a portion of the thirty-four constitutional principles. 36 The CA was limited not only in 
content by the Interim Constitution but also in structure. The Interim mandated an independent 
panel of constitutional experts and lawyers to serve as an initial deadlock-breaking mechanism, 
with a referendum on constitutional issues serving as another and more threatening option. The 
Interim Constitution also mandated complete adoption of a document within two years of the 
first sitting of the national assembly and two thirds majority for adoption of the text essentially 
ensuring that the ANC could not pass a final constitution unilaterally.37  
The CA drafting process involved extensive public information and evaluation 
campaigns. Millions of copies of drafts were circulated and a public newsletter and television 
program, called Constitutional Talk, charted developments in the debates. An independent 
survey conducted in April 1996 found that the campaign reached 73% of all adult South Africans 
or 18.5 million people. The CA received over two million submissions from the public.38 While 
this stage demonstrated a fervent desire for transparency and public comment, many of the 
critical negotiations took place in one-on-one discussions.39 Due to time constraints and the vast 
number of responses, public input fostered a culture of constitutional respect and legitimacy for 
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the new government more than it impacted the content of individual clauses.40 Ramaphosa 
acknowledged that while the final constitution did not reflect every submission, the campaign 
allowed South Africans to directly engage with the constitution writing process.41  
 In the CA debates, even where ANC negotiators were not particularly constrained by the 
constitutional principles, they were influenced by the Interim Constitution. ANC negotiators 
were hesitant to overhaul institutions that worked in the interim period or where consensus 
between the major parties existed due to a fear of deadlock, breaking a working system, or 
angering the negotiators in other parties.42 In the final debates over the property clause, the NP’s 
Sheila Camerer pointed to the consensus reached on the property clause for the interim 
constitution, highlighting that land reform should be addressed while protecting existing property 
rights.43 While the ANC maintained its preference for a property clause that advanced reform 
rather than protected existing property rights, negotiators recognized pursuing this position 
would disrupt the already established consensus. The ANC argued against privileging existing 
property rights because members of its constituency had been barred from ownership, yet 
Camerer maintained that a constitutional property right would protect those constituents once 
they attained property through land reform measures.44  
On the final day of CA negotiations, the ANC and NP agreed that the current proposal 
reflected a fair agreement between protection for property owners and a need for land reform. 
While conceding that the current racialized land distribution was not sustainable, the 
conservative Democratic Party maintained that the property clause should not allow the 
                                                 
40 Ebrahim and Miller, “Creating the Birth Certificate,” 138. 
41 Ramaphosa, “Negotiating a New Nation,” 81. 
42 Spitz and Chaskalson, The Politics of Transition, 425. 
43 Ebrahim, The Soul of a Nation, 209. 
44 Ebrahim, The Soul of a Nation, 210. 
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government to pursue reform but rather protect access to property equally for all.45 The Pan 
Africanist Congress viewed the final constitution property clause, specifically subsection 8, as an 
improvement to the interim constitution clause but maintained that the issue of property rights 
should be decided through a democratic process rather than through negotiations.46 
The final constitution was adopted May 8, 1996. It was then sent to the constitutional 
court for certification. Certifying that the constitution fit with the thirty-four principles proved 
difficult because the principles were the result of political bargaining and therefore written 
broadly in order to please disparate interests. Furthermore, the court sought to establish its own 
legitimacy and risked its reputation with either an acceptance or rejection of the constitution.47 
The hearings occurred from July 1st to July 11th. Two months later, the court ruled that the May 
8th text did not comply with the principles in eight instances. Nevertheless, they did not reject the 
document and advised that through revision it could fit with the principles. In response to an 
objection that the property clause as proposed did not protect a fundamental human right to 
property, the court found that in comparison to international human rights doctrines, where a 
right to property was not consistently protected, the draft constitution amply protected such a 
right.48 
  On October 11, the CA approved new amendments in compliance with the court’s 
advice, and, finally, on December 4, 1996 the court certified the final constitution.49 The 
property clause from the final constitution, which would become known as Section 25, reads:    
                                                 
45 Ebrahim, The Soul of a Nation, 219. 
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47 Ebrahim and Miller, “Creating the Birth Certificate,” 140. 
48 P. I. Meakin, “Fundamental Rights to Property,” Submission to the Constitutional Assembly 
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49 Ebrahim and Miller, “Creating the Birth Certificate,” 142. 
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25. (1) No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, 
and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property. 
(2) Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general application— (a) for a 
public purpose or in the public interest; and (b) subject to compensation, the amount of 
which and the time and manner of payment of which have either been agreed to by those 
affected or decided or approved by a court.  
(3) The amount of the compensation and the time and manner of payment must be just and 
equitable, reflecting an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of 
those affected, having regard to all relevant circumstances, including— (a) the current use 
of the property; (b) the history of the acquisition and use of the property; (c) the market 
value of the property; (d) the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition 
and beneficial capital improvement of the property; and (e) the purpose of the 
expropriation.  
(4) For the purposes of this section— (a) the public interest includes the nation’s 
commitment to land reform, and to reforms to bring about equitable access to all South 
Africa’s natural resources; and (b) property is not limited to land. 
(5) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable 
basis.  
(6) A person or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a result of past 
racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of 
Parliament, either to tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress.  
(7) A person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 as a result of past 
racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of 
Parliament, either to restitution of that property or to equitable redress.  
(8) No provision of this section may impede the state from taking legislative and other 
measures to achieve land, water and related reform, in order to redress the results Chapter 
2: Bill of Rights 11 of past racial discrimination, provided that any departure from the 
provisions of this section is in accordance with the provisions of section 36(1).50  
 
The language of the property clause of the final constitution, like that of the Interim, 
attempted to balance a protection of property rights with an intention to reform land distribution. 
It did so in listing various factors the courts must consider in deciding when property may be 
expropriated and the just compensation for expropriated land. The court became the solution to 
the ANC and NP’s inability to politically agree on one standard approach to land restitution. The 
clause created a balance between the ANC and NP’s objectives for land distribution, allowing 
the courts to decide when property rights trumped redistribution and when they did not. The 
                                                 
50 The Constitution of South Africa, 1996, Section 25. Section 36 provides that laws may limit 
the Bill of Rights only when the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality, and freedom.  
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constitutional enshrinement of this fundamental disagreement was the product of a constitution-
writing process in which the ANC gave minority interests a disproportionate weight in setting the 
parameters of the final text in order to reach a compromise and proceed towards inclusive 
democracy.   
 
Restitution Land Claims Act 
 As mandated by Section 25, once in power, the ANC had to take legislative measures to 
“foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis.”51 The 
Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994 was the first law passed by the interim government to 
address land reform. The law aimed to assist the courts in their constitutionally mandated task of 
determining substantive land reform. The law defined the groups that may make land claims as 
well as the conditions under which land restitution could be granted. It also created the 
Commission on Restitution of Land Rights and the Land Claims Court (LCC) to facilitate and 
adjudicate land claims proceedings. With the creation of this system, the government delegated 
determinations of fair and just redress for land dispossession and inequality to the LCC. This 
assignment asked judges to balance equitable reform and property rights in individual cases as 
political negotiators had been unable to resolve this in the constitution.  
 The Act first defined criteria for making restitution claims. The claimant must have been 
dispossessed after June 19, 1913, the day the Natives Land Act became law.52 The claimant also 
must have been dispossessed as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices.53 The 
                                                 
51 The Constitution of South Africa, 1996, S 25(5). 
52 Natives Land Act restricted land ownership in South Africa based on race. Black South 
Africans, who at the time made up 67% percent of the population of South Africa, were allocated 
only seven percent of arable land. 
53 Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994, Preamble. 
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act defined restitution as “restoration of a right in land or equitable redress,” where equitable 
redress meant “the granting of an appropriate right in alternative state-owned land or the 
payment of compensation.”54 Restitution could not be granted if, at the time of dispossession, the 
claimant was paid just and equitable compensation or granted “any other consideration which is 
just and equitable” at the time of dispossession.55 
 The Act then outlined the responsibilities of the Commission on Restitution of Land 
Rights. The commission’s purpose was to assist claimants throughout the restitution process. The 
commissioners advised claimants and acted as a mediator between the claimants and the court – 
outlining any outstanding issues in the restitution process for the court to decide. The 
Commission was also responsible for transparency both to the claimant about court proceedings 
and to the general public about how to engage in the restitutions process and about the overall 
progress of the court.56 Regional commissioners referred cases to the LCC when they could not 
settle disputes through mediation or negotiation or when the commissioner decided the case was 
ready for hearing by the court.57  
 The Restitution of Land Rights Act gave the LCC power to “determine a right to 
restitution;” “determine or approve compensation payable in respect of land owned by or in the 
possession of a private person upon expropriation;” “determine the person entitled to title to 
land;” “grant declaratory order on a question of law relating to Section 25 of the constitution;” 
“determine whether compensation or any other consideration received by any person at the time 
of any dispossession of a right in land was just and equitable;” and to determine enforcement and 
                                                 
54 Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994, Definitions.   
55 Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994, (2)(2)b. 
56 Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994, (6)(1). 
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implementation of restitution agreements.58 Furthermore, the act defined the factors to be taken 
into account by the court in making restitution and compensation decisions:  
(a) The desirability of providing for restitution of rights in land to any person or 
community dispossessed as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices; 
(b) the desirability of remedying past violations of human rights; 
(c) the requirements of equity and justice; 
(cA) if restoration of a right in land is claimed, the feasibility of such restoration; 
(d) the desirability of avoiding major social disruption; 
(e) any provision which already exists, in respect of the land in question in any 
matter, for that land to be dealt with in a manner which is designed to protect and 
advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination 
in order to promote the achievement of equality and redress the results of past racial 
discrimination; 
(eA) the amount of compensation or any other consideration received in respect of 
the dispossession, and the circumstances prevailing at the time of the dispossession; 
(eB) the history of the dispossession, the hardship caused, the current use of the 
land and the history of the acquisition and use of the land; 
(eC) in the case of an order for equitable redress in the form of financial 
compensation, changes over time in the value of money; 
(f) any other factor which the Court may consider relevant and consistent with the 
spirit and objects of the Constitution 
 
In these criteria, as in earlier internal ANC policy shifts and constitutional negotiations, 
the government struggled to decide the relative weights of a right to restitution and a right to 
property. The Act required the court to consider opposing factors such as the history of 
dispossession and the desirability of avoiding major social disruption to satisfy the requirements 
of equity and justice. If the court were to prioritize the history of dispossession in their decision 
making, vast social disruption may result with the redistribution of land in an equitable manner. 
Further, by recognizing both the desirability of remedying past violations of human rights and 
changes over time in the value of property, the Act required the court to deal with restitution as 
both an issue of human rights and of economics. The Act recognized the simultaneous economic 
and human rights injustices in land dispossession in the past, yet lacked a meaningful distinction 
                                                 
58 Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994, (22)a, b, c, c(A), c(B), c(E). 
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or prioritization of land reform as either an economic project or a human rights one. The Act laid 
out the requirement of equity and justice without defining criteria for what the achievement of 
equity and justice in the project of land restitution would be. These contradictions and broad 
expectations in the court’s mandate meant that rather than creating an effective system for 
adjudicating claims, the Act effectively delegated the undecided questions of land reform from 
the constitutional negotiations to the LCC judges. The ANC government then did not itself 
devise a system of land redistribution for its constituents, but laid the basis for a neoliberal 
system in which the onus was on individuals to file claims or purchase land.  
 
Conclusions 
 In the focus on establishing an inclusive democracy without civil war or economic 
collapse, the ANC agreed to a constitution-making process that prioritized continuity and 
stability from the apartheid government to an interim body and finally to the democratically 
elected government. The process allowed disproportionate minority influence in the interest of 
inclusivity and representation. This was in the ANC’s interest for many reasons: it wanted a 
peaceful, timely, and legitimate transition to democracy. Furthermore, as explained in Chapter 1, 
the ANC leadership itself did not share a unified land reform policy, this weakened their 
negotiating position. It is not surprising that the final property clause then entrenched two 
opposing political agendas: the interest of those dispossessed by apartheid who favored 
redistribution for the public and the interest of those privileged by apartheid who favored 
protection for individuals. This compromise, among others, allowed the transition to democracy 
in South Africa to happen. Yet in this process, the distance between the ANC leadership and its 
constituents grew. The ANC leadership planned land reform through deals with the leadership of 
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the NP more so than through listening to their followers and adhering to their earlier principles. 
The agreed upon system left the Land Claims Court judges to balance opposing values in making 
judgements about specific land claim cases. In the following chapter, I will examine the 




‘Willing Buyer, Willing Seller’ Land Reform: The ANC’s Implementation of the 
Negotiated Clause 
 
During the decade following the creation of the Constitution, tension developed between 
the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of state responsibility to affect land reform and the 
government’s own assessment of their role. As described in Chapter Two, in a stability ensuring, 
multi-step negotiating process, the African National Congress (ANC) created a constitutional 
property clause, Section 25, that protected both existing property rights and the government’s 
right to expropriate land.1 This system left a Land Claims Court (LCC) to decide which right 
prevailed on a case-by-case basis. This chapter shows that another result of this compromised 
clause was that it allowed the ANC to enact a wide range of policies. Section 25 did not so much 
prohibit expropriation as allow for the ANC to withdraw from an active role in land reform. Only 
in recent years, when new leftist parties threatened the ANC’s political supremacy, did it return 
to promises of expropriation. In 2019, the government aimed to enact policies of expropriation 
through amending Section 25. It is not, however, the clause that prevented the ANC from 
pursuing an active role in land reform, but its own political priorities.  
In this chapter, I juxtapose the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of Section 25 and the 
Restitution of Land Rights Act (Restitution Act) with the ANC’s policies. According to the 
Constitution, Land Claims Court (LCC) cases could be appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Appeals (SCA) and then to the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court provided the final 
decision in cases involving constitutional issues. When tasked with assessing the results of Land 
Claims Court cases, the Constitutional Court delivered an opinion on the responsibility of the 
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government to affect land reform. The broad range of policies possible under the property clause 
is evident in the difference between the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of government 
responsibility and the ANC government’s actual policies. 
I examine the tension between the Constitutional Court and the government through, first, 
an assessment of the Constitutional Court’s analysis in three cases: Alexkor Ltd v. Richtersveld 
Community, Department of Land Affairs v. Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (PTY) Ltd, and 
Florence v. Government of the Republic of South Africa. Next, I compare the Constitutional 
Court’s reading of the broad state responsibility to provide redress under the Restitution Act with 
the ANC’s Willing Buyer, Willing Seller policy. The state withdrew from land redistribution 
instead of employing the protected state power they had negotiated into the property clause. This 
was due to external pressure as well as the government’s own commitment to ensuring stability. 
By 2019, the continued mismatch between the promise of restitutive justice through land 
redistribution and the ANC government’s withdrawal from an active process of land 
redistribution had led to a widespread rejection of the ANC in favor of parties promising 
expropriation as well as a movement to amend Section 25.  
 
Constitutional Court Cases 
The Constitutional Court’s decisions show how the government’s approach to land 
reform operated in contrast to a broader constitutional commitment to redress and restitutive 
justice. Three cases in particular exemplify this dynamic. These are three of nearly a dozen 
instances in which the Constitutional Court heard appeals from the Supreme Court of Appeals 
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about constitutional matters in Land Claims Court proceedings.2 This limited number meant that 
appeal to the Constitutional Court was not a viable option for all claimants frustrated by the 
outcome of their LCC cases. However, the number of and consistency in opinions, as shown 
below, made the Constitutional Court’s criticism clear.  
With the inception of a constitutional democracy in South Africa, judges had to transition 
from a practice of respecting the word of the legislature as supreme to judging the legislature’s 
actions against the principles of the Constitution.3 This shift further complicated the ANC’s 
request that the judges weigh opposing constitutional principles in deciding land claims. Due to 
their specific mandate, the judges of the Constitutional Court were more clearly committed to 
activist applications of the law for restitutive justice. The Constitutional Court’s rebuke of the 
lower court decisions was one of many cues to the government that its land policy was not 
working, yet the ANC continued to forsake expropriation for market-based policies.    
The decisions below offer an alternative for potential state action under the property 
clause and Restitution Act. At worst, the Constitutional Court’s decisions can be read as direct 
chastisements of the ANC government for not fulfilling its constitutional duties. At best, they 
present hope for the potential of land reform under the Restitution Act and the Constitution as it 
stands – a hope largely absent from contemporary South African politics.    
Alexkor Ltd v. Richtersveld Community concerned a community with claims to an area of 
land in the Northern Cape Province. The claimants, the Richtersveld Community, traced 
habitation of the area of land to before British colonization. In 1847, the British Crown assumed 
                                                 
2 Land Claims Court appeals Constitutional Court of South Africa. 
https://collections.concourt.org.za/handle/20.500.12144/1/discover?rpp=10&page=1&query=%2
2land+claims+court%22&group_by=none&etal=0.  
3 Theunis Roux, “Pro-Poor Court, Anti-Poor Outcomes: Explaining the Performance of the South 
African Land Claims Court,” South African Journal on Human Rights 20 no. 4 (2004): 533-34. 
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control of the area. In the early twentieth century, under South African rule as a British 
protectorate, diamond mines were discovered in the area. The government sold land to miners as 
they believed the property belonged to the British Crown, not the inhabitants.4 As mining 
companies’ desire to control the area grew, so too did government action to dispossess the 
Richtersveld Community. Ultimately, the government created a reserve for the people of the 
Richtersveld Community and a state-owned mining company, which became the private 
company, Alexkor, to control the mining rights for the area.5 Both the LCC and the Supreme 
Court of Appeals (SCA) heard the case. The Constitutional Court overturned the decision of the 
LCC based on its narrow application of the Restitution Act. 
Under a broader reading of the Restitution Act, the Constitutional Court unanimously 
decided to restitute the Richtersveld Community’s rights to the land. The Constitutional Court 
acknowledged that the government allowed registered deed land holders to continue to access the 
land once under the control of the mining company while it forcibly removed land holders whose 
claim to the land was through indigenous law property rights. Some black inhabitants were able 
to obtain deed ownership. Yet as indigenous claims were the traditional method by which black 
people owned land, the Constitutional Court found that the government’s denial of these rights 
constituted a racially motivated action.6  
The Constitutional Court differed from the LCC in its application of the Restitution Act’s 
timeframe for dispossession and criteria for racially motivated actions. First, Alexkor and the 
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government, which remained the largest shareholder in the company, argued that the 
dispossession occurred under direct governance by the British crown, before the constitutional 
cut-off date of 1913.7 The LCC accepted this claim. Based on this limited timeframe, the LCC 
determined the dispossession was motivated by concerns related to the diamond mining, not 
racial concerns.8   
The LCC declined to take a holistic view and consider the relation of the government’s 
refusal to acknowledge property rights post-1913 to earlier racially motivated dispossession. The 
LCC judgement read: “the brushing aside of claims which persons of colour might have had in 
respect of land because they were considered insufficiently civilized, could well be a wrong for 
which the Restitution Act provides no remedy. A remedy for such a wrong, if it exists, will have 
to be sought elsewhere.”9 This was in line with a 1999 decision by the LCC in Minister of Land 
Affairs v. Slamdien, there, they held that racially discriminatory laws were “those that sought 
specifically to achieve the (then) ideal of spatial apartheid, with each racial and ethnic group 
being confined to its particular racial zone.”10 In Alexkor, The Constitutional Court agreed with 
the SCA that this standard for racially discriminatory laws was “unduly restrictive.” the 
Constitutional Court offered its own, and final, interpretation of the purpose of the Restitution 
Act: “its purpose is to provide redress to those individuals and communities who were 
dispossessed of their land rights by the government because of the government’s racially 
                                                 
7 Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994, Preamble. Constitutional cut-off date set to June 19, 
1913 as this day marked the passage of the Natives Land Act while dispossession occurred 
previous to this date, the Act formally restricted land ownership on the basis of race. 
8 Mostert, “The Case of the Richsterveld Community,” 165. 
9 Richtersveld Community and Others v Alexkor Ltd and Another 2001 (3) SA 1293 (LCC) para 
120. http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2001/10.pdf.  
10 Minister of Land Affairs and Another v Slamdien and Others 1999 (4) BCLR 413 (LCC) para 
26. http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/1999/6.pdf.  
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discriminatory policies in respect of those very land rights.”11 The Constitutional Court further 
held that laws with the impact of racial dispossession qualified even if not directly advancing 
spatial apartheid.12  
Here, significantly, the Constitutional Court read the Act’s purpose as broad redress 
instead of restitution under only spatial apartheid laws. The justices rejected the LCC’s narrow 
reading and fully acknowledged indigenous law and the racial impact of governmental rejection 
of indigenous land rights. The laws qualifying as racially motivated, argued the Constitutional 
Court, could not be narrowly read as those which directly forced inhabitants off land but were 
instead those which had an impact on dispossession. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court chose 
to look outside the set cut-off dates— a seemingly procedural step that contributed to the LCC 
rejection— based on its activist reading of the overall impact. The LCC did not share the 
Constitutional Court’s willingness to decide individual cases within a larger purpose of redress.  
In 2007, in Department of Land Affairs v. Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd, the 
Department of Land Affairs represented a community of labor tenants on the Boomplaats farm in 
the Limpopo province that could trace undisturbed indigenous rights to the land back to the 19th 
century. 13 White settlers moved into the land and claimed ownership, filing deeds, and 
instituting a system of labor tenancy where previous inhabitants could live, build homes, and 
raise cattle on the land so long as they worked for the white owners two days a week.14 The first 
                                                 
11 Alexkor Ltd v. Richtersveld Community, para. 98. 
12 Alexkor Ltd v. Richtersveld Community, para. 99. 




14 Department of Land Affairs v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd, para. 15. 
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white owner’s deed was from 1889.15 The land passed through multiple white owners while the 
previous black owners continued farming until 1969 when the owner forced the labor tenants off 
the land and sold the farm to the Goedgelgen fruit company. The owner claimed he terminated 
labor tenancy because it did not work efficiently for his own business needs and he was not at the 
time aware of apartheid legislation.16 In this case, the applicants acknowledged the dispossession 
took place before 1913; however, they sought return of the limited areas around the homesteads 
they lost in 1969.  
The LCC and SCA rejected the claim for lack of a causal relationship between the 
dispossession and racist policy, prompting the Constitutional Court to write an upgraded 
standard for determining the impact of policy on dispossession. The two courts disagreed about 
the phrase in both the Property Clause and Section Two of the Act that says eligible claimants 
were dispossessed as “a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices.”17 The LCC 
acted upon a narrow, causal reading of ‘a result of.’ The Constitutional Court instead advocated 
for a broad understanding that included acknowledgement of the full context of apartheid South 
Africa as well as the interlocking racially targeted legislation tailored to degrade black property 
holders’ rights. 
The LCC found no evidence that the claimants did not voluntarily accept the labor 
tenancy position, therefore the dispossession was not racially motivated.18 The SCA found that 
even if the seller knew of the racial policies degrading labor tenancy for black inhabitants at the 
time, knowledge alone did not constitute definite proof of causal connection between racially 
                                                 
15 Department of Land Affairs v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd, para. 7. 
16 Department of Land Affairs v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd, para. 19. 
17 Department of Land Affairs v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits, para. 49; Restitution of Land 
Rights Act 22 of 1994, Preamble. 
18 Department of Land Affairs v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd, para. 26. 
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motivated law or practice and dispossession.19 The Constitutional Court rejected the lower 
courts’ reading of ‘a result of’ to refer only to a causal connection.20 
The Constitutional Court also rejected the SCA and LCC’s “but for” test. The “but for” 
test made the lower courts decide culpability based on asking “but for” the discriminatory laws 
and practices, would the owners have terminated the claimants’ labor tenancies? If they 
concluded that the owner would have, the lower court invalidated the claim. In contrast, the 
Constitutional Court advocated for a purposive reading of the Restitution Act that took into 
account the broad framework of legislation relevant to dispossession: 
It is by now trite that not only the empowering provision of the Constitution but 
also of the Restitution Act must be understood purposively because it is remedial 
legislation umbilically linked to the Constitution. Therefore, in construing “as a 
result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices” in its setting of section 2(1) 
of the Restitution Act, we are obliged to scrutinise its purpose. As we do so, we 
must seek to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. We must 
prefer a generous construction over a merely textual or legalistic one in order to 
afford claimants the fullest possible protection of their constitutional guarantees. In 
searching for the purpose, it is legitimate to seek to identify the mischief sought to 
be remedied. In part, that is why it is helpful, where appropriate, to pay due attention 
to the social and historical background of the legislation. We must understand the 
provision within the context of the grid, if any, of related provisions and of the 
statute as a whole including its underlying values.21 
 
 I conclude that the term “as a result of” in the context of the Restitution Act is 
intended to be less restrictive and should be interpreted to mean no more than “as a 
consequence of” and not “solely as a consequence of”.22   
 
In its opinion, the Constitutional Court stated the seller’s knowledge of apartheid 
legislation did not matter. Instead, the lower courts must take into account the context created by 
apartheid legislation. According to the Constitutional Court, the Restitution Act mandated that 
                                                 
19 Department of Land Affairs v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd, para. 26. 
20 Department of Land Affairs v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd, para. 50. 
21 Department of Land Affairs v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd, para. 53. 
22 Department of Land Affairs v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd, para. 69. 
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the LCC provide restitution based not on a transactional legalistic level but, within a broad, 
purposeful understanding of the injustice of land dispossession during apartheid. The 
Constitutional Court relied heavily on precedent from Richtersveld in their decision. They quoted 
Richtersveld about the necessity of including pre-1913 legislation in the interpretation of the 
facts when the “purpose is to throw light on the nature of a dispossession that took place 
thereafter or to show that when it so took place it was the result of racially discriminatory laws or 
practices that were still operative at the time of the dispossession.”23 One law cannot be viewed 
in isolation, but as contributing to a context of dispossession without an option for black land 
owners to contest. Like in Richtersveld, the Constitutional Court rejected the lower courts’ 
narrow application of the Act in favor of a historically based interpretation seeking justice and 
redress.  
In 2014, in Florence v. Government of South Africa, Florence’s husband could not move 
into the home he purchased in 1970 because it was in a designated white area in Cape Town. 24 
In 1995, he filed a restitution claim for the property. Due to the development on the property, the 
LCC rejected his claim for restitution although it allowed him to pursue equitable redress of 
financial compensation and a memorial on the site.25 The lower court calculated the monetary 
compensation as the amount he paid converted to present day value using the Consumer Price 
Index.26 The LCC calculated and paid this as well as R10,000 for the construction of a 
                                                 
23 Department of Land Affairs v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd, para. 24; Alexkor Ltd v. 
Richtersveld Community, para. 40. 
24 Florence v Government of the Republic of South Africa 2014 (6) SA 456 (CC), para. 8. 
https://collections.concourt.org.za/bitstream/handle/20.500.12144/3742/Full%20judgment%20Of
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25 Florence v Government of the Republic of South Africa, para. 9.  
26 Consumer Price Index is calculated based on consumption. It measures the changes in the 
price for a market basket of consumer goods. This is inherently different from investment in 
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memorial.27 Unsatisfied, Florence appealed the amount given for the memorial as well as the use 
of the CPI in determining the amount of monetary compensation.28  
The Government argued that a private agreement between Florence and the present-day 
owner of the property as well the inclusion of Florence’s family in a museum, constituted a 
memorial and the state did not need to pay for a plaque.29 In response, Florence argued that the 
cost of the plaque fell under the government’s wide remedial powers promised in the Restitution 
Act.30 The Constitutional Court held that the private agreement did not remove state 
responsibility in this situation.31 The opinion included “restitution is not only directed at righting 
the wrongs of spatial apartheid, but also at carrying out ‘important symbolic work by 
acknowledging histories of injustice and their impacts on individuals, families, and 
communities.’”32 Again, like in the decisions referenced earlier, the Constitutional Court 
chastised the lower courts for their narrow reading. Ultimately, the majority opinion required the 
government to pay for the plaque. 
Florence further argued that the CPI was an inadequate determination of monetary 
compensation because it neither rectified the dispossession nor placed the claimant in the same 
position as if they received restoration—the Constitutional Court upheld this assessment. 33 The 
CPI failed to consider the benefits of an investment in property long term and therefore did not 
                                                 
27 Florence v Government of the Republic of South Africa, para. 17. 
28 Florence v Government of the Republic of South Africa, para. 18. 
29 Florence v Government of the Republic of South Africa, para. 27. 
30 Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994, 35(1). 
31 Florence v Government of the Republic of South Africa, para. 29. 
32 Florence v Government of the Republic of South Africa, para. 35; Quote used in opinion 
originally from Ruth Hall “Reconciling the Past, Present and Future” in Walker et al (eds) Land, 
Memory, Reconstruction and Justice: Perspectives on Land Claims in South Africa (Ohio 
University Press, Athens 2010): 17. 
33 Florence v Government of the Republic of South Africa, para. 46. 
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put the claimant in a position similar to as if they were never dispossessed.34 The CPI money 
Florence received would not enable her to buy a property in the present day similar to the one 
stolen from her family. The failure to deliver equivalent restitution to claimants resulted in 
compounded injustice for those who did not receive restoration.35 Through endorsing Florence’s 
stance, the Constitutional Court established their definition of monetary compensation: “the 
purpose of equitable redress is to place the dispossessed owner in the position that she would 
have been in if the land had not been taken.”36 The Constitutional Court then qualified that no 
action they could require would put the claimant in a position similar to that before 
dispossession. The emotive opinion read, restoration could not “knit together the bones of 
history. The brutality of apartheid irreparably smashed them.”37 The Constitutional Court 
rejected the use of the CPI and advocated for the use of the current value of the property in 
conjunction with the LCC’s wide discretionary power to consider other factors. The 
Constitutional Court argued applying current value, a practice included explicitly in the 
Constitution and used in some instances by the LCC, was more fitting with a purposeful reading 
of the Act and the goal of parity between those who received restoration and those who received 
monetary restitution.38 
In the Florence opinion, the Constitutional Court read the Restitution Act as not just 
requiring direct rectification of wrong—paying the claimant the amount they should have been 
paid at the time of the sale in present day value—but seeking to redress systematic injustice—the 
                                                 
34 Florence v Government of the Republic of South Africa, para. 55. 
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long term effect of oppressive legislation.39 In the opinion, the Constitutional Court compared 
the Restitution Act to the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act as two instances 
of legislation intended to deal with the consequences of apartheid.40 The Promotion of National 
Unity and Reconciliation Act created the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and had an 
explicit goal of acknowledging and addressing human rights violations under apartheid in order 
to rehabilitate victims and facilitate the development of a united nation.41  This comparison, early 
in the opinion, signaled the Constitutional Court’s general interpretation of the Restitution Act 
was in line with their interpretation in the two cases described above; one of intention to redress 
and rectify not simply to settle monetary or property disputes between land owner and claimant.  
 Throughout these three cases, the Constitutional Court repeatedly held the LCC’s 
interpretation of the Restitution Act to be too narrow. The Constitutional Court advocated for a 
more activist interpretation with a clear intent of redress. These opinions demonstrate the broad 
scope of constitutional state action under the property clause and Restitution Act. The LCC’s 
limited application of state power to deliver redress was not unique to that court but 
characteristic of the ANC’s land reform program overall.   
In the above cases, the Constitutional Court repeatedly demanded that the LCC adopt a 
broader and more purposeful reading of the Restitution Act. The disparity in the two 
interpretations was not just between the LCC and the Constitutional Court, but also between the 
Constitutional Court and the ANC government. The Constitutional Court’s interpretation 
reflected the ANC’s earlier intentions for land redistribution under the clause. Ironically, the 
ANC did not adopt policies that reflected the Constitutional Court’s interpretation. The ANC 
                                                 
39 Florence v Government of the Republic of South Africa, para. 49. 
40 Florence v Government of the Republic of South Africa, para. 2. 
41 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995. 
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relied on neoliberal redistribution policies instead of making use of the state expropriative 
powers protected by the clause. Repeatedly, ANC and South African presidents implemented 
ineffective, market-based land policies. Each development in land reform policy reflected 
specific priorities of the president of the time. Overall, state withdrawal characterized the ANC’s 
land reform policy.  
 
Poverty Reduction and National Reconciliation: Section 25 During the Mandela Presidency  
Under President Nelson Mandela in 1995, the ANC government began to enact land 
reform through the ‘Willing Buyer, Willing Seller’ model, a drastically different model from its 
earlier calls for expropriation and redistribution. The program fit with the ANC’s need to placate 
both their support base and big business interests as the new leadership of the united South 
Africa.42 Mandela appointed Derek Hanekom, a white male, fluent in Afrikaans and a long-time 
member of the ANC, to be minister of the Department of Land Affairs. This selection was 
indicative of the government’s commitment to stability and pleasing and uniting as many groups 
as possible.43 The Willing Buyer, Willing Seller program allowed the government to fulfill 
promises of redistribution to their supporters without actively breaking up large commercial 
agriculture land holdings, and thus catering to the interests of big business.  
 The ANC began programs of land reform and restitution in 1995 but it formalized its 
approach in the Department of Land Affairs’ 1997 White Paper on South African Land Policy. 
The stated goals of the program were to redress the injustices of apartheid, foster national 
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2014), 60.  
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reconciliation and stability, underpin economic growth, and improve household welfare and 
alleviate poverty.44 The goals were to be achieved through government assisted market 
transactions: “Rather than become directly involved in land purchase for the land redistribution 
program, government will provide grants and services to assist with the purchase of land.”45 
These grants and services were part of a three-pronged approach: restitution, redistribution, and 
tenure reform. Tenure reform referred to efforts to upgrade the land rights of tenant laborers. In 
this chapter, I will focus primarily on restitution and redistribution as they relate most closely to 
the negotiations over Section 25 and Restitution Act described in chapter two and in the court 
cases above.  
 The Willing Buyer, Willing Seller model applied to both restitution and redistribution. 
For restitution, dispossessed individuals and communities worked with the Commission on 
Restitution of Land Rights and the Land Claims Court to demonstrate previous ownership of a 
plot of land, dispossession after 1913, and dispossession by racially motivated laws or policies. 
Because of their constitutional commitment to protect existing property rights, the ANC intended 
the pure restitution aspect to be a limited part of land reform. To enable redistribution, the ANC 
instituted a series of grants, elaborated below, meant to facilitate black buyer’s entrance into the 
agricultural market.      
In practice, Willing Buyer, Willing Seller involved an extended negotiations period 
which de-incentivized both buyer and seller from participating in the system. First, the potential 
buyer discovered the desired plot of land. Sellers were at liberty to decide which land to put on 
the market, often choosing undesirable plots. Next, the buyer and seller had to come to a formal 
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45 Department of Land Affairs, White Paper of South African Land Policy, 9. 
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agreement about the value of the property which an independent valuer confirmed. This process 
could take up to two years. Then, the seller had to wait for the state to evaluate and accept the 
claim. The state could refuse funds for the sale based on a problem with the application or with 
the DLA’s own lack of funds.46 If the government offered a lower price, the seller had the power 
to refuse and abandon the deal. No standard for determining compensation existed, so claimants 
did not have the necessary information to judge whether restitution or compensation would be 
personally more beneficial.47 This extended process proved stressful and complex on both ends, 
yet as the seller ultimately possessed the land regardless of the outcome, they maintained the 
upper hand in negotiations and often in the outcome. 
The DLA was technically and economically handicapped. Between 1994 and 2004, it 
received R 7.3 billion, less than half of the World Bank Organization’s recommendation of how 
much they should receive in five years.48 This made up .3% of the state’s budget and was divided 
among the DLA and the Commission on Restitution of Land Rights.49 This division was unclear 
in terms of responsibilities and payment. Untrained staff and a lack of efficient technology to 
track and assess claims and to measure progress further handicapped the DLA. Originally, they 
set a three-year period for the lodgment of claims beginning May 1, 1995, a five-year period for 
the commission and the court to finalize all claims, and a ten-year period for the implementation 
of court orders. They sought to transfer 30% of the country’s land to the poor and landless within 
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five years.50 Given the Department’s institutional weakness and low budget, this target was 
impossible. 
The policies in the 1997 White Paper created a hierarchy with sellers at the apex, 
followed by claimants with education and means. At the bottom, were rural, uneducated and 
poor dispossessed people.51 Through restitution, claimants stood to receive their land back, 
alternative land, or monetary compensation. Through redistribution they could receive a grant to 
purchase land from willing sellers. However, the claimant’s own resources greatly affected their 
ability to navigate bureaucracy and exert pressure to push their claim forward in the court 
system. Furthermore, the grants evolved to require claimants to supply labor or capital in order to 
receive land. Those without these advantages had a lower chance of receiving meaningful 
redress. The neo-liberal system of deregulation and state withdrawal lacked built-in measures to 
check this inequality.52 
The first redistribution policy, as implemented in the 1997 White Paper was the 
Settlement/ Land Acquisition Grant. This grant specifically targeted poor households as only 
those earning less than R1500 per month could apply for the R16000 grant.53 Often groups of 
poor households formed to apply as a unit. 54 Still, the grant sum was not enough for investment 
in the land or building homes after the transfer so these groups were left sharing a small and 
unproductive plot unable to use it to accumulate wealth.55  
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The World Bank Organization’s suggestions in 1993-94 directly inspired The Settlement/ 
Land Acquisition Grant policy.56 In their proposal, the WBO advised agricultural liberalization 
and a program of grants to allow more individuals to enter the land market and purchase small 
plots. The WBO advised against government-led expropriation or direct purchase of white 
owned land. Instead it advocated for a market-dependent strategy with a court system to resolve 
disputed settlements.57  
 
Black Entrepreneurship: Section 25 During the Mbeki Presidency 
In June 1999, newly elected President Mbeki appointed a new minister of the Department 
of Land Affairs, Thoko Didiza. Under Didiza, following criticism from the WBO, the 
government shifted the focus of the grants from the poor to wealthier farmers. In 2000, the WBO 
returned to South Africa to criticize the development of large group-owned land plots that were 
not agriculturally productive.58 These unproductive plots, ironically, were a product of their 
previous recommendations. Instead, the WBO advocated for a policy that enabled those with 
some resources to invest them into agriculture. The new Land Redistribution and Agricultural 
Development policy launched in August 2001. This policy contained grants ranging from R 
20,000 to R 100,000 to applicants who could prove through labor or means contribution their 
dedication to farming.59 The criteria shifted from earning below a certain income threshold to 
demonstrating, through means contribution, preparedness to farm. Therefore, the redistribution 
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system shifted to focus on rewarding productive farmers rather than providing land for the 
impoverished. The ANC also limited the number in a group application to ten.60 This too made it 
more difficult for the poor to benefit from the system. This new policy still relied completely on 
a market based, Willing Buyer, Willing Seller approach. Even in the government’s limited role 
in affecting land reform, they chose not to assist the poor and most vulnerable.  
By 2005, widespread criticism of the ineffectiveness and bias inherent in the Willing 
Buyer, Willing Seller model compounded by criticism from the Constitutional Court and fear of 
land seizures like those occurring in neighboring Zimbabwe drove the government to further 
address land reform policy.61 In the first ten years since the launch of their program in 1995, only 
4% of land had been redistributed. This amount was far from the government’s original goal of 
30% transfer.62 The government hosted the National Land Summit in July 2005. There, they 
announced “today we have buried Willing Buyer, Willing Seller.”63 The government recognized 
the ineffectiveness of Willing Buyer, Willing Seller, heard suggestions from representatives 
involved in the restitution and redistribution processes as well as from the South African 
Communist Party and international NGOs. Still the summit did not produce consensus on the 
details of a new approach.  
From 2006 to 2011, the government continued Willing Buyer, Willing Seller but 
increasingly acted as the willing buyer. The new grant system called Proactive Land Acquisition 
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Strategy sought to speed up the rate of land redistribution and bolster black famers in 
commercial agricultural. In this program, the DLA purchased land and then leased it to black 
farmers for a period of time in which they could prove their ability to farm the land. Proactive 
Land Acquisition Strategy did not expand access to land for non-agricultural or poor land holders 
and it rarely actually transferred land to black owners as the government frequently remained the 
land holder. Furthermore, if claimants could not demonstrate their ability to farm through capital 
or skills they were evicted and landless again. Most of all, though, in their new position as the 
willing buyer, the government experienced the realities of their own system; they were not able 
to afford to pay the sellers the market-based prices for the land.  
 
State Intervention: Section 25 During the Zuma Presidency 
In 2009, after his election, President Zuma, riding a wave of support from workers and 
landless people, restructured the Department of Land Affairs into the Department of Rural 
Development and Land Reform.64 In 2010, the new Department committed to reviewing all 
current land reform policy and published their own framework of policy in 2012.65 The 
Department sought to address the slow pace of redistribution and the high prices the government 
paid for acquiring land. To do this, they established the Office of the Valuer General. The Valuer 
General position aided the government in navigating the land market and determined the just and 
equitable compensation for the government to pay sellers. In 2013, President Zuma described the 
approach by saying “the government will now pursue the ‘just and equitable’ principle for 
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compensation, as set out in the Constitution instead of the ‘Willing Buyer, Willing Seller’ 
principle which forces the state to pay more for the land than the actual value.”66 The phrase ‘just 
and equitable’ came from the wording of Section 25 where it alluded to a balance between “the 
public interest and the interests of those affected.”67  
Officially, the government acknowledged reliance on market value impeded reform. 
Nonetheless, it still shied from a commitment to expropriation. With the creation of the Valuer 
General, the ANC, again, enshrined a balance between competing objectives instead of 
implementing an actionable plan for redistribution. In order for the government to pay the just 
and equitable compensation as decided by the Valuer General, they would have to expropriate 
land.68 Otherwise, the seller could seek a higher bidder.  
The ANC government’s continued refusal to incorporate expropriation meaningfully into 
its land reform polices spurred mass political pushback. In the 2010s, parties with platforms 
centered around expropriation, specifically the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), began to 
threaten the ANC’s dominance amongst landless voters. This threat pushed the ANC to 
demonstrate its commitment to land reform. The EFF party is a pro-black pro-worker political 
party founded in 2013. Central to their agenda is ensuring that Section 25 of the Constitution is 
amended to allow for expropriation without compensation.69 In the 2014 national elections, the 
                                                 
66 Jacob Zuma, ‘State of the Nation Address by His Excellency Jacob G. Zuma, President of the 
Republic of South Africa on the Occasion of the Joint Sitting of Parliament’ (Cape Town, 
February 2013). 
67 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 25(3). 
68 Michael Aliber, “Unravelling the ‘Willing Buyer, Willing Seller’ Question,” in Land Divided, 
Land Restored: Land Reform in South Africa for the 21st Century, ed. Ben Cousins and Cherryl 
Walker (Auckland Park: Jacana, 2015), 151. 
69 Economic Freedom Fighters, Economic Freedom Fighters Founding Manifesto: Radical 
Movement Towards Economic Freedom in our Lifetime, July 2013.  
 78 
EFF received 6.35% of the popular vote, enough to become the third largest opposition party.70 
In July 2018, President Cyril Ramaphosa, the successor to Zuma, announced his ANC 
government would approve an amendment to Section 25 that specified a plan for expropriation 
without compensation.71 In December 2018, the Parliament approved amendment to Section 25. 
At the time of writing, the amendment process is underway. Presumably, the amendment’s 
content will promote expropriation without compensation.72  
 
Conclusions 
The move to amend Section 25 suggests that the clause inherently limits the potential for 
land reform. Yet, the problem, as shown in the Constitutional Court’s decisions is not that 
Section 25 precludes active state involvement in land reform but that, as a negotiated balance 
between two agendas, one based on the right to property and another on the right to 
compensation and restitutive justice, it allows for a wide range of policy implementation. Indeed, 
in the twenty-year tenure of the ANC, Mandela, Mbeki, and Zuma oversaw the adoption of at 
least three different interpretations of Section 25. Amending the clause to explicitly dictate a 
program of expropriation without compensation is necessary not because the original clause is 
prohibitive but because it does not strictly bind governmental action. Instead, it allows the 
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government freedom to implement a policy that suits interests that are susceptible to 
manipulation from powerful external pressures. The ANC leaderships’ early commitments to 
expropriation were far from the stability-ensuring, WBO-pleasing policies they implemented 
once in power. Only when the EFF threatened the ANC’s supremacy did it return to a 
commitment to expropriation. The problem of land reform in South Africa today appears more 
directly a problem of political will than it is of the existing constitutional property clause.
Conclusion and Epilogue 
In 1993, when South African Communist Party leader Joe Slovo forfeited his combative 
stance to call for negotiations with the National Party, a fellow SACP member accused him of 
advocating for a scenario in which “the masses are absent and, instead, the issue becomes 
primarily that of tradeoffs between negotiators, constrained by the logic of the negotiations 
process.”1 This accusation presents an oft-repeated critique of the African National Congress’ 
handling of the land question. During the pre-CODESA stage, the ANC reoriented itself from a 
champion of the oppressed and impoverished masses to a willing compromiser with the NP in 
order to obtain power under a new democratic government. Undoubtedly, prioritizing inclusive 
democracy was a worthy goal for the ANC leadership. Yet, the relatively peaceful and stable 
transition to democracy came at the cost of land overhaul.  
Despite the ANC’s initial formation in 1912 to oppose discriminatory land legislation, by 
the time of CODESA, the leadership’s preferred policy was a neoliberal one of deferred state 
action and reliance on individual actors in the market. This caused a mismatch in expectations as 
the ANC’s constituents largely still hoped for state-led redistribution of land among the land 
poor. Earlier nationalist and communist-influenced visions for reform were superseded by the 
ANC leadership’s desire to speed along the transition to a united democracy. 
During formal negotiations, the ANC continued to prioritize the transition to democracy 
without developing effective land reform laws and policies. ANC negotiators were not equipped 
with a specific land reform plan. Through a series of compromises, negotiators agreed to 
constitutionally protect both property rights and a state right to expropriate. The ANC then 
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assigned the responsibility of weighing these opposing constitutional mandates on the local level 
to the courts. 
 Section 25’s protection of property rights limited the ANC’s options for revolutionary 
land redistribution. Still, the ANC negotiators had succeeded in maintaining a constitutionally 
acceptable option for expropriation. Since 1996, it has not been Section 25 that prevented the 
ANC from using state expropriative power. Instead, successive ANC presidents implemented 
policies that relied primarily on individual claimants and the markets to effect restitution. Only in 
2019, when the ANC faced threats to its political hegemony did the leadership promise 
expropriation through amending Section 25.  
The ANC’s plan to amend Section 25 is a misplaced effort to address ineffective land 
reform. The amendment effort is a political strategy meant to appeal to land poor constituents 
through broad promises that are detached from the leadership’s actual policy plans. The move to 
amend Section 25 to orient more explicitly towards expropriation is primarily driven by a 
response to the growing popularity of ANC opposition parties.  
In May 2019, South African voters will vote to elect a new parliament and president. In 
March 2019, the ANC committee working on amending Section 25 declared it will not be 
complete with its recommendations before the new parliament takes office.2 Due to this, on the 
subject of land reform, voters must choose between the ANC’s unfinished plan to amend the 
Constitution and the EFF’s explicit promises to take all land under state control.3 The ANC has 
shown that even with the constitutional ability to enact state led reform, it prefers to designate 
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redistribution to market, judiciary, and individual forces. Because of this history, it is unclear 
how and if amending the constitution to make more explicit a state right already in the clause 
will lead to dramatic land redistribution. The ANC has not presented how the economic, social, 
and global political forces preventing it from pursuing state-led redistribution in negotiations 
have shifted to allow such a program. In fact, ANC president Ramaphosa, one of the initial 
negotiators of this form of limited land reform, has promised to protect foreign investments in 
the country from expropriation; the ANC under Ramaphosa has promised that expropriation will 
not threaten food security nor economic development.4 These promises, especially of protecting 
development from state efforts to redistribute land are reminiscent not only of earlier ineffective 
ANC land policy but also of NP land reform policy.5 
The EFF promises to assume state ownership of all land to facilitate redistribution. This 
idealistic claim carries populist appeal, but the EFF’s ability to institute this remains untested. If 
elected, the party will face many of the same economic and social challenges that led ANC 
leadership to retreat from their own early idealistic revolutionary promises. Missing from South 
African voter’s options are creative policies that recognize land as a symbol for larger, lasting 
forms of economic inequality.  
The starkly unequal distribution of land on racial lines, the role of land inequality as a 
basis for apartheid and resistance to apartheid, and the reality of land as a stand in for other 
forms of economic inequality make land reform an emotional and controversial political issue. 
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Therefore, political leaders owe the landless, land poor and all South Africans a serious 
reckoning with whether physical return of land remains the true solution to the land problem in 
2019 and beyond. Given the realities of the dominance of commercial farming, environmental 
change, and growing populations, situating the return of farm plots as the ultimate goal of land 
reform is an unpromising solution. Political leadership ought to consider if restitutive justice 
could be better delivered through forms of reparations, affirmative action, or addressing the 
striking levels of economic inequality that have only grown since the end of apartheid. It is 
necessary for the ANC to recognize that not only is amending Section 25 an ineffective solution, 
but simply returning certain percentages of land may be as well. To solve the land question, the 
ANC should address economic inequality and other lasting consequences of apartheid that land 
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